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BAIL NULLIFICATION
Jocelyn Simonson*
This Article explores the possibility of community nullification beyond the jury
by analyzing the growing and unstudied phenomenon of community bail
funds, which post bail for strangers based on broader beliefs regarding the
overuse of pretrial detention. When a community bail fund posts bail, it can
serve the function of nullifying a judge’s determination that a certain amount
of the defendant’s personal or family money was necessary to ensure public
safety and prevent flight. This growing practice—what this Article calls “bail
nullification”—is powerful because it exposes publicly what many within the
system already know to be true: that although bail is ostensibly a regulatory
pretrial procedure, for indigent defendants it often serves the function that a
real trial might, producing guilty pleas and longer sentences when an individ-
ual cannot afford to pay their bail. By examining the ways in which commu-
nity bail funds serve the functions that a nullifying jury might—allowing
popular participation in an individual case to facilitate larger resistance to the
policies and practices of state actors—this Article argues that community bail
funds have the potential to change how local criminal justice systems operate
on the ground, shifting and shaping political and constitutional understand-
ings of the institution of money bail. Community bail funds give a voice to
populations who rarely have a say in how criminal justice is administered,
especially poor people of color. And the study of bail funds helps point toward
other ways in which bottom-up public participation can help create a criminal
justice system that is truly responsive to the communities that it is ultimately
supposed to serve.
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Introduction
Scholars have long studied the power of community actors to nullify
official decisions by state actors in the criminal justice system.1 This scholar-
ship analyzes “nullification” as a process involving jurors: when citizens on a
jury acquit someone despite their legal guilt, the jurors make a potent state-
ment about a particular defendant or law, in the process transferring power
from legislatures, judges, and prosecutors to a small group of citizens.2 This
focus on the jury as a site of nullification is understandable—jury nullifica-
tion has been a prominent feature of American criminal justice since the
country’s founding, and the jury plays a singular role as the ultimate mo-
ment of community input into a criminal case.3 But the power of the jury is
waning. In our post-trial world, fewer than five percent of criminal cases end
in a trial of any kind,4 and the public at large has little input into the
1. See generally Teresa L. Conaway et al., Jury Nullification: A Selective, Annotated Bibli-
ography, 39 Val. U. L. Rev. 393, 394–424 (2004) (surveying 150 years of the scholarly debate
around jury nullification).
2. See Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 125,
145–51 (describing the controversial power of jury nullification); Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nulli-
fication Within the Rule of Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1149, 1154 (1997) (describing ways in which
jury nullification can be in line with, or subvert, the rule of law); Paul Butler, Racially Based
Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale L.J. 677, 681–88 (1995)
(describing the power of racially based jury nullification in response to larger racial injustices
in the criminal justice system); see also infra Section I.A.
3. See Jenny E. Carroll, Nullification as Law, 102 Geo. L.J. 579, 584–609 (2014)
(describing the history of jury nullification).
4. More than 95 percent of criminal cases end in pleas. See Univ. at Albany, Defendants
Disposed of in U.S. District Courts, Sourcebook of Crim. Just. Stat. Online tbl. 5.46.2004,
www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242004.pdf [http://perma.cc/X32Q-TUUL] (95 percent of
state felony convictions in 2004 resulted in pleas); Univ. at Albany, Criminal Defendants Dis-
posed of in U.S. District Courts, Sourcebook of Crim. Just. Stat. Online tbl. 5.24.2009,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242009.pdf [https://perma.cc/L53C-4SSD] (96.4
percent of federal criminal cases that did not end in dismissal ended with a guilty plea).
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workings of everyday criminal adjudications.5 If something akin to nullifica-
tion could take place outside of the jury room, it would open up room for
community input into the reality of criminal justice today: in the words of
the Supreme Court, “a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”6
In this Article, I argue that a form of community nullification can and
does occur in the interstices of pretrial procedures and criminal case out-
comes in the form of community bail funds. In recent years, community
groups in jurisdictions across the United States have increasingly begun to
use bail funds to post bail on behalf of strangers, using a revolving pool of
money. These funds include new charities set up in partnership with public
defender offices in Massachusetts,7 the Bronx,8 Brooklyn,9 and Nashville10 as
well as identity-based bail funds that range from a bail fund for transgender
sex workers of color in Queens, New York11 to a bail fund supporting com-
munities of color targeted by policing in Chicago,12 and bail funds formed
5. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 911, 923–24 (2006); Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial
World, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2173, 2179–81 (2014) [hereinafter Criminal Court Audience]
(describing the lack of community participation in everyday courtroom adjudication in the
“post-trial world”).
6. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (“[T]he reality [is] that criminal justice
today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”).
7. Alysia Santo, Bail Reformers Aren’t Waiting for Bail Reform, Marshall Project
(Aug. 23, 2016, 10:00 PM), https:/www.themarshallproject.org/2016/08/23/bail-reformers-
aren-t-waiting-for-bail-reform [https:/perma.cc/CA44-F4CY].
8. Bronx Freedom Fund, One Year Report (2014), http://static1.squarespace.com/
static/54e106e1e4b05fac69f108cf/t/54ebdd14e4b0f761f48d08c4/1424743700810/Bronx+Free
dom+Fund+One+Year+Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4UZ-X4CD].
9. Matt Sledge, Community Bail Fund for Poor Defendants to Launch in Brooklyn, Huf-
fington Post (Mar. 17, 2015 4:26 PM (updated Mar. 23, 2015)) http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2015/03/17/brooklyn-community-bail-fund_n_6886836.html [https://perma.cc/7JB2-
HZGB] (describing launch of Brooklyn Community Bail Fund).
10. See Toby Sells, Just City’s Bail Program Worked in Nashville, Can’t Get Consensus in
Memphis, Mem. Flyer (Jul. 14, 2016, 4:07 PM), http://www.memphisflyer.com/NewsBlog/
archives/2016/07/14/just-citys-bail-program-worked-in-nashville-cant-get-consensus-in-mem
phis [http://perma.cc/52RH-ASGT] (describing Just City’s Nashville Bail Fund).
11. Zaira Corte´s, Fund Seeks to Address Police Profiling of Transgender Women, Voices of
N.Y. (May 22, 2012), http://voicesofny.org/2012/05/fund-seeks-to-address-police-profiling-of-
transgender-women/ [https://perma.cc/M4HB-7NMB] (translating Zaira Corte´s, Crean Fondo
De Fianzas Para Transge´neros, El Diario (May 16, 2012), http:/www.eldiarony.com/2012/05/
16/crean-fondo-de-fianzas-para-transgeneros/ [https://perma.cc/BVL4-764F]) (describing the
Lorena Borjas Community Fund).
12. Chi. Comm. Bond Fund, https://www.chicagobond.org/ [https://perma.cc/S5CJ-
PHHU] (last visited Oct. 7, 2016) (“CCBF supports individuals whose communities cannot
afford to pay the bonds themselves and who have been impacted by structural violence.”).
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by activists within the Movement for Black Lives,13 who have used crowd-
sourced funding to post bail for hundreds of protesters and allies in Fergu-
son,14 Baltimore,15 Cleveland,16 Oakland,17 and Baton Rouge.18 Each time a
community bail fund pays bail for a stranger, the people in control of the
fund reject a judge’s determination that a certain amount of the defendant’s
personal money was necessary for the defendant’s release.19 This can, at
times, serve a function analogous to jury nullification: what this article calls
“bail nullification.”20
The analogy between community bail funds and nullifying juries is nec-
essarily an imperfect one. Jury nullification is a longstanding communal
power, protected by the Constitution, with undeniable results on case out-
comes. The communal decision that bail funds make, in contrast, cannot be
as neatly classified as a choice between conviction and acquittal, nor does the
process enjoy constitutional protection. When community bail funds nullify
the law, it is not the formal law on the books, but rather the law on the
13. See Amna A. Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J.
Legal Educ. 352, 356–60 (2015) (describing the rise of Movement for Black Lives, also known
as the Black Lives Matter movement).
14. See, e.g., Molly Gott, Ferguson Jail Support Guidelines and Legal Collective Info, Mis-
sourians Organizing for Reform & Empowerment (July 13, 2015, 11:57 AM), http://
www.organizemo.org/ferguson_jail_support_guidelines_and_legal_collective_info_updated_ju
ly_12_2015 [https://perma.cc/C3KL-2GFE] (describing the bond fund for protesters in Fergu-
son as part of the Ferguson Legal Collective).
15. See, e.g., Valerie Richardson, GoFundMe Drops Campaign for Baltimore Rioters After
Conservative Complaints, Wash. Times (May 3, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2015/may/3/gofundme-drops-campaign-for-baltimore-cops-keeps-e/ [https://perma.cc/
EHQ2-42K4] (describing Baltimore Protesters Bail Bond Fund).
16. Rachelle Smith Erste, Bail Fund Relief for Cleveland Activists, FundRazr, https://fund
razr.com/campaigns/cwIN3 [https://perma.cc/3MFK-QH53] (last visited Oct. 7, 2016).
17. See, e.g., Bay Area Anti-Repression Committee Bail Fund, Rally.org, https://rally.org/
arcbailfund [https://perma.cc/3YKK-EKRS].
18. See, e.g., Lilly Workneh, Hundreds Donate to Baton Rouge Fund to Help Bail Out
Protesters, Huffington Post (July 10, 2016, 2:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
baton-rouge-fund-bail-protesters_us_57827424e4b0c590f7e9cce7 [https://perma.cc/2NLZ-T4E
8].
19. When a judge or magistrate sets money bail in a criminal case, they are making a
finding that a specific amount of a defendant’s personal money is necessary in order to ensure
that the defendant returns to court and does not commit crimes pending trial. See, e.g., Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 22-2802(1) (2007) (“Any person charged with a crime shall . . . be ordered
released pending preliminary examination or trial upon the execution of an appearance bond
in an amount specified by the magistrate and sufficient to assure the appearance of such
person before the magistrate when ordered and to assure the public safety.”). Although com-
mercial third parties—bail bondsmen—often post the actual bail after receiving a set fee or
percentage of the bond amount from a defendant, the concept remains the same: that the
commercial entity will use the money from the defendant or her or her family to ensure that
the defendant returns to court. See What is Bail?, Prof. Bail Agents of U.S., https://pbus.site-
ym.com/?1 [https://perma.cc/849U-JHAR] (“A bail agent is paid a premium or fee to insure
that a criminal defendant, released into the custody of the bail agent, fulfills the obligation to
appear for subsequent hearings and for trial, as ordered by the court.”).
20. Thank you to Devon Carbado for initially suggesting this term to me.
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ground: the discretionary decisions of prosecutors and judges that render
bail a tool of pretrial detention rather than a mode of release. Moreover,
community bail funds vary enormously in how they function—some are
run by mobilized grassroots groups intent on abolishing the criminal justice
system as we know it, while others operate as more of a private, pretrial-
services agency, making sure that their neighbors return to court on time.21
In this article, however, I engage in a sustained argument that community
bail funds can and often do serve as a form of community nullification. This
analogy facilitates an exploration of the power of a practice that is otherwise
easy to dismiss as a mere extension of the ability of families, friends, and bail
bondsmen to post bail in individual cases. By examining the ways in which
community bail funds serve the functions that a nullifying jury might—
allowing popular participation in an individual case to facilitate larger resis-
tance to the policies and practices of state actors—I argue that community
bail funds have the potential to contribute to legal and political change from
the ground up.
Community bail funds inject community input into a critical moment
in the public adjudication of a criminal case. For most indigent defendants,
bail is the ballgame: if a judge sets bail in an amount that they can afford,
then they are able to fight their case from a position of freedom, without
losing jobs, housing, or custody of their children.22 On the other hand, if bail
is set in an amount higher than a defendant can pay, that defendant is in-
centivized to plead guilty early in the process, without the benefit of ex-
tended discussions with counsel, case investigation, or discovery from the
prosecution.23 Studies have shown time and time again that pretrial deten-
tion increases the chances of a conviction, extends the probable length of a
sentence, and decreases the chance that the charges will be dismissed alto-
gether.24 Moreover, as the public learned in the summer of 2015 with the
21. See infra Section I.B.
22. See generally Ram Subramanian et al., Vera Inst. Justice, Incarceration’s
Front Door: The Misuse of Jails in America 12–13 (2015), http://www.vera.org/sites/de
fault/files/resources/downloads/incarcerations-front-door-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PH3-
LHXK] (“The[ ] consequences [of pretrial detention]—in lost wages, worsening physical and
mental health, possible loss of custody of children, a job, or a place to live—harm those incar-
cerated and, by extension, their families and communities.”).
23. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv.
L. Rev. 2463, 2467 (2004) (describing the profound impact of the bail/pretrial decision on plea
bargaining); Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 Yale
L.J. 1344, 1354–56 (2014) (describing “plea-inducing” effects of pretrial detention); Human
Rights Watch, The Price of Freedom 2–3 (2010), http://www.pretrial.org/download/
The%20Price%20of%20Freedom%20-%20Human%20Rights%20Watch%202010.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LA6B-9LE4] (“Most persons accused of low level offenses when faced with a bail
amount they cannot make will accept a guilty plea; if they do not plea at arraignment, they
will do so after having been in detention a week or two.”).
24. For recent reports summarizing studies that demonstrate these correlations, see Jus-
tice Policy Inst., Bail Fail: Why the U.S. Should End the Practice of Using Money
for Bail 24–26 (2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/
bailfail.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TUF-6FFN]; Subramanian et al., supra note 22, at 14; Paul
Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 Stan. L.
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deaths of Kalief Browder in New York City and Sandra Bland in Texas—both
of whom had been in jail because they could not pay bail—jail is often a
violent and damaging place.25 When community bail funds post bail, they
are not only facilitating the liberty of a defendant, they may also be changing
the eventual outcome of that criminal case.
Over time, as community bail funds post bail for multiple defendants,
these individual acts can add up to a larger statement about the fairness of
money bail. Literal action—the posting of bail—itself becomes a form of
on-the-ground resistance to the workings of the criminal justice system. The
result is a powerful form of popular input into criminal justice from outsid-
ers who rarely have a say in how their local justice systems are administered.
Moreover, because they operate publicly, community bail funds are able to
engage with political and constitutional principles in ways that juries cannot.
When they engage in “bail nullification,” community bail funds have
the potential to shape and shift legal meaning in at least three important
ways. First, community bail funds contest the meaning of “community” in
the setting of bail. The prominent conception of a judge’s bail decision is of
a balancing game between a defendant and the community: a judge must
weigh an individual defendant’s interest in liberty and presumed innocence
against the community’s interest in preserving safety and making sure the
defendant returns to court.26 But when a “community” group posts bail, it
calls into question the widespread assumption that the community and the
defendant sit on opposite sides of a scale of justice. Second, community bail
funds shift the conversation about the constitutional limits on money bail.
In particular, community bail funds undermine the bedrock assumptions of
a constitutional jurisprudence that has traditionally held that money bail
systems do not violate the Excessive Bail27 or the Due Process Clauses,28 and
has only just begun to consider the ramifications of modern money bail for
Equal Protection.29 And third, bail nullification has a demonstrable effect on
Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 13–22), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=2809840 [https://perma.cc/A4VW-42T2]. See also Shima Baradaran & Frank L. Mc-
Intyre, Predicting Violence, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 497, 555 (2012) (aggregating studies over time);
sources cited infra note 52 (collecting more recent studies).
25. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder 1993–2015, New Yorker (June 7, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015 [https://perma.cc/QZ
8E-CQTC]; Leon Neyfakh, Why Was Sandra Bland Still in Jail?, Slate (July 23, 2015, 8:17 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/07/sandra_bland_is_the_bail_sys
tem_that_kept_her_in_prison_unconstitutional.html [https://perma.cc/WJQ4-CRNK].
26. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750–52 (1987) (describing commu-
nity safety and defendant’s liberty interest as two sides of a scale).
27. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1951) (“Bail set at a figure higher than an amount
reasonably calculated to fulfill [its] purpose is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.” (cit-
ing United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657, 659 (7th Cir. 1926))).
28. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746–51 (articulating substantive due process standards for
bail statutes).
29. See, e.g., Pierce v. City of Velda City, No. 4:15-CV-570-HEA, 2015 WL 10013006, at
*1 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015) (“No person may, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, be held in custody after an
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political and legislative change.30 Community bail funds provide to the pub-
lic real-life examples of indigent defendants returning to court without hav-
ing undermined public safety, despite an expert judicial determination that
personal money was needed to prevent flight and mayhem.31 The aggregate
effect is to send a message to judges and to policymakers that something is
awry in the current legal scheme governing bail.
Although prominent critics have questioned America’s bail system for
decades,32 and even centuries,33 by all accounts we are currently in the midst
of a new wave of bail reform aimed at reducing the criminal justice system’s
reliance on money bail and pretrial detention.34 Legal scholars have taken an
active part in this new wave of change, suggesting ways in which bail can be
arrest because the person is too poor to post a monetary bond.”). In recent years, a number of
scholars have questioned aspects of the constitutionality of money bail. See, e.g., Laura I. Ap-
pleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1297, 1321–23 (2012) (arguing that pretrial detention constitutes pun-
ishment); Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 723,
746–54 (2011) (arguing that many current bail practices violate the Due Process Clause’s pre-
sumption of innocence); Wiseman, supra note 23, at 1383–92 (arguing that the Eighth
Amendment’s excessive bail clause provides a right for a defendant to be electronically moni-
tored rather than detained). Moreover, there are pockets of legal challenges that are suc-
ceeding. See, e.g., Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 780–91 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc)
(finding unconstitutional an Arizona bail law that automatically detained undocumented im-
migrants charged with violent offenses), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 2046 (2015); Pierce, 2015 WL
10013006, at *1 (ordering a settlement agreement based on acknowledgement that city’s bail
scheme for low-level offenses violates the Equal Protection Clause). As I explain in Section
III.B, infra, community bail funds are uniquely situated to contribute to these constitutional
changes.
30. In New York City, for example, local and state politicians have recently invoked the
results of the Bronx Freedom Fund, a leading community bail fund, in calling for larger efforts
at bail reform, and even in setting aside money for a bail fund funded and administered by the
city. See David Howard King, Bronx Program Serves as Inspiration for Mark-Viverito’s City-
Wide Bail Fund Proposal, Gotham Gazette (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.gothamgazette.com/
index.php/government/5588-bronx-program-serves-as-inspiration-for-mark-viveritos-city-
wide-bail-fund-proposal [https://perma.cc/5YVM-E2BP].
31. See id.
32. See generally Timothy R. Schnacke, Nat’l Inst. of Corr., Fundamentals of Bail
7–18 (2014), http://static.nicic.gov/UserShared/2014-11-05_final_bail_fundamentals_septem
ber_8,_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2RW-SK7M] (collecting studies critical of money bail in
American over the last century).
33. See, e.g., 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 45 (Phillips Bradley
ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1835) (“[Bail] is hostile to the poor and favorable only to the rich.
The poor man has not always a security to produce . . . .”).
34. Schnacke, supra note 32, at 7–9 (stating that America is “firmly in the middle of a
third [generation]” of bail reform); Lorelei Laird, Court Systems Rethink the Use of Financial
Bail, Which Some Say Penalizes the Poor, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/courts_are_rethinking_bail [https://perma.cc/K4SJ-DQBA] (describing re-
cent wave of reform efforts).
592 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 115:585
smarter and more just—through prediction tools,35 through judicial train-
ing,36 through legislative change,37 through the input of juries,38 and through
better oversight of bail-setting decisions.39 The study of community bail
funds has a unique role to play in this landscape, separate and apart from
efforts to reform laws, policies, and procedures. The importance of commu-
nity bail funds is tightly linked to their participatory quality, one which al-
lows individual acts of posting bail, often in low-level amounts, to add up to
a communal expression of frustration with legal and constitutional stan-
dards. This bottom-up participation pushes directly against the gaps in par-
ticipation and power that characterize our contemporary criminal justice
system, in which those most affected by the criminal justice system have the
least input into its everyday policies and practices.40 The study of commu-
nity bail funds thus shines a light on efforts by traditionally disempowered
populations to resist, and ultimately change, the contours of local criminal
justice practices.41
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces a theory of com-
munity nullification in the post-trial world. I describe the rise of community
bail funds and explain how they can at times function as a potent form of
nullification outside of the jury room. Parts II and III then explore the
power of community bail funds to shift and shape legal meaning. Part II
describes the rhetorical power of bail funds to disrupt and recast the place of
community in pretrial procedures. In Part III, I connect this expressive func-
tion of community bail funds to the ability of bail funds to serve as both a
form of constitutional engagement and a force for political change. Then, in
Part IV, I revisit the concept of bail nullification. I take on two possible
objections to the practice of community bail funds when they function as
bail nullification—first as a subversion of the rule of law, and second as
35. See, e.g., Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 24, at 557–60; Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disen-
tangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, BYU L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at
28–33); Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail Determinations,
16 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 919, 956–57 (2013); cf. Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous De-
fendants (Aug. 15, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2826600 [https://perma.cc/D6ZB-K48T] (suggesting policy reforms for pretrial
risk assessment tools).
36. See Jones, supra note 35, at 953–55.
37. See, e.g, Gouldin, supra note 35 (manuscript at 34–42); Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing
Bail, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 417, 454–64 (2016).
38. See Appleman, supra note 29, at 1302–06.
39. See Jones, supra note 35, at 958–60.
40. See generally Amy E. Lerman & Vesla M. Weaver, Arresting Citizenship: The
Democratic Consequences of American Crime Control (2014) (describing democratic
exclusion of groups most likely to be arrested and incarcerated); Stephanos Bibas, The Ma-
chinery of Criminal Justice (2012) (describing the participatory gap between insiders and
outsiders in the criminal justice system).
41. This is the third in a series of articles that analyzes grassroots forms of public partici-
pation in local criminal justice institutions. See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audi-
ence in a Post-Trial World, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2173, 2179–81 (2014); Jocelyn Simonson,
Copwatching, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 391 (2016).
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legitimizing force in an unjust system. I then argue that the nullifying power
of community bail funds has emerged as a powerful and even necessary
method of popular participation in a criminal justice system marred by
profound democratic deficits, especially for the poor people of color most
likely to fall under its ambit.42
I. Community Nullification in a Post-Trial World
Jury nullification in a criminal case occurs when jurors choose not to
follow the law as it is given to them by the judge.43 When juries engage in
nullification by acquitting a defendant despite legal guilt, they do something
powerful and controversial, exercising power over government actors and
potentially pushing back against larger injustices in the system. There is no a
priori reason to think that this ability of community members to nullify
official decisionmaking must be confined to the jury box. However, the
longstanding scholarly debate over community nullification has been con-
fined to the study of jury nullification, and especially nullification by petit
juries adjudicating guilt and innocence.44 This limited conception of com-
munity nullification underestimates the power of communities to intervene
in criminal adjudication.45 This Part puts forth a conception of community
42. See generally Lerman & Weaver, supra note 40.
43. See Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 877, 881–86
(1999) (defining jury nullification).
44. See generally Conaway et al., supra note 1, at 394–424 (describing the scholarly debate
around jury nullification). But see Josh Bowers, Grand-Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Charging Decision, in Criminal Law Conversations 578, 578–80 (Paul H. Robinson et al.
eds., 2009) (arguing that grand juries can and do engage in jury nullification). Nullification
can potentially occur in the civil context as well. See Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86
Iowa L. Rev. 1601 (2001); Kaimipono David Wenger & David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries,
2003 Wis. L. Rev. 1115.
45. Some scholars have proposed that we bring juries into other aspects of the criminal
process—for example, sentencing hearings, suppression hearings, and even bail hearings. See,
e.g., Appleman, supra note 29, at 1363–66 (2012) (bail juries); Laura I Appleman, The Plea
Jury, 85 Ind. L.J. 731, 750–59 (2010) (plea juries); Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The
Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 33,
102–16 (2003) (calling for juries to make some sentencing determinations); Bibas, supra note
5, at 959–60 (plea juries); Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47
Wake Forest L. Rev. 319, 343–49 (2012) (grand juries); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury
Innovation: Toward a Functional Makeover of the Ancient Bulwark of Liberty, 19 Wm. & Mary
Bill Rts. J. 339, 354–58 (2010) (grand juries that review pleas and sentencings); Jenia Iontch-
eva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 Va. L. Rev. 311, 365–69 (2003) (sentencing
juries); Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 Harv. C.R.–C.L. L. Rev. 359,
394–99 (2005) (grand and petit juries that review charging, sentencing, and policymaking
decisions); Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 801, 872–78 (2003) (“plea
panels”); Meghan J. Ryan, Juries and the Criminal Constitution, 65 Ala. L. Rev. 851, 892–98
(2014) (proposing that juries make findings regarding constitutional questions in criminal
cases). Presumably, these hypothetical juries would also be able to use nullification in making
their decisions. But scholars have not asked whether community nullification may already be
occurring outside of the jury box.
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nullification46 beyond the jury, one in which communities can contribute
to—and reject—institutional decisions at other moments in a criminal case.
Locating moments of community participation outside of the jury de-
liberation room is important because in the world of plea bargaining, it is
actually a series of discretionary institutional choices—to stop, to arrest, to
charge, to appoint counsel, to set bail, to offer a plea deal—that taken to-
gether have a profound, if not complete, influence on the outcome of a
criminal case.47 To locate moments of community resistance or nullification
at these institutional decision points, rather than at the ultimate point of a
verdict, opens up room for community input into criminal adjudication in
the post-trial world.
The bail-setting determination is one such institutional decision point:
shortly after an arrest, a judge or magistrate determines whether a defendant
will be released pending resolution of her case and whether that release will
be dependent on conditions that most often include the paying of money
bail.48 When a judge or magistrate sets bail at an amount outside of the
financial reach of a criminal defendant—a common occurrence—that de-
fendant remains incarcerated until her case is resolved. Across the United
States, the use of money bail as a pretrial release condition increased by 32
percent between 1992 and 2006, and continues to rise.49 Today, the majority
of criminal defendants are required to post financial bail for their pretrial
release.50 At any one time, more than 450,000 people are detained pretrial
46. By using the term “community nullification,” I mean to exclude from the concept of
nullification the actions of government actors who may act beyond the letter of the law in their
decisionmaking. For example, scholars have used the word “nullification” to explain ways in
which judges and prosecutors, respectively, are able to steer guilty parties away from prosecu-
tions or high sentences. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L.
Rev. 1243, 1243 (2011); Michael J. Saks, Judicial Nullification, 68 Ind. L.J. 1281 (1993).
47. See generally Bibas, supra note 23, at 2467 (describing the “many structural impedi-
ments that distort bargaining,” including quality of defense counsel, agency costs, and the bail/
pretrial decision); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision
Not to Prosecute, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1655, 1692–1703 (2010) (describing how discretionary
decisions by police officers and prosecutors lead to the processing of misdemeanor arrests in a
way that diverges from determinations of guilt and innocence); Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Mana-
gerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 611, 664 (2014) (describing how “the
structure of incentives”—including bail—“and not necessarily the legal or factual merits of the
case, often drives disposition”); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1313,
1346–47 (2012) (describing how, in low-level cases, “[t]he confluence of police authority to
trigger incarceration simply by asserting that a minor offense has been committed, combined
with the pressures of bail and general acquiescence of the poor, can create the perfect storm of
wrongful pleas”).
48. See generally Justice Policy Inst., supra note 24, at 10–16. Local jurisdictions vary
enormously in their bail-setting trends, and some jurisdictions have outlawed money bail alto-
gether. See Schnacke, supra note 32.
49. See Justice Policy Inst., supra note 24, at 10–16. The average bail amount of bail
set increased by more than $30,000 during that time as well. Id.
50. Jessica Eaglin & Danyelle Solomon, Brennan Ctr. For Justice, Reducing Ra-
cial and Ethnic Disparities in Jails 19 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default
/files/publications/Racial%20Disparities%20Report%20062515.pdf [https://perma.cc/HV9F-
VDPZ].
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because they have not posted money bail.51 A defendant detained pretrial
faces a greater likelihood of conviction and incarceration, as well as a longer
sentence, than if she were free pending trial.52
The result is that hundreds of thousands of defendants across America,
disproportionately people of color,53 wait in local jails for dispositions of
their cases, often held on $500 bail or less.54 The ostensible idea behind this
pretrial detention is that if a defendant truly intends to come back to court
and stay out of trouble, she would have the ability or inclination to secure
money for her own release. Community bail funds challenge this concept
directly, publicly, and from the bottom up, injecting a moment of commu-
nity input into an adjudication that is otherwise controlled by insiders. In so
doing, community bail funds can function as a form of community nullifi-
cation of local bail practices, resisting both a judge’s individual decision to
set bail and the larger aggregate trend of pretrial detention through money
bail.
In this Part, I introduce the idea of community nullification beyond the
jury, presenting a conception of community nullification that includes the
actions of many community bail funds. I begin below by fleshing out the
central attributes of community nullification in its most common form, the
petit jury. I identify three important features of nullification that can be
51. See Todd D. Minton & Zhen Zeng, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2014 (2015) http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
jim14.pdf [https://perma.cc/RD9X-DAYJ]; Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass In-
carceration: The Whole Pie 2016 (2016), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/
pie2016.html [https://perma.cc/QQN9-2W69] (finding that there are 451,000 unconvicted de-
fendants in local jails at any one time).
52. Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., Laura & John Arnold Found., Investigat-
ing the Impact of Pretrial Detention on Sentencing Outcomes 10–11 (2013), http://
www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_state-sentencing_FNL.
pdf [https://perma.cc/CA7S-D7KS]; Subramanian et al., supra note 22, at 12–18; Meghan
Sacks & Alissa R. Ackerman, Bail and Sentencing: Does Pretrial Detention Lead to Harsher
Punishment?, 25 Crim. Just. Pol’y Rev. 59, 72 (2014); Christine Tartaro & Christopher M.
Sedelmaier, A Tale of Two Counties: The Impact of Pretrial Release, Race, and Ethnicity Upon
Sentencing Decisions, 22 Crim. Just. Stud. 203, 218 (2009). A series of rigorous studies re-
leased in 2016 have confirmed these correlations. Heaton et al., supra note 24; Will Dobbie et
al., The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence
from Randomly Assigned Judges (Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 22511, 2016), http://
scholar.harvard.edu/files/cyang/files/dgy_bail_july2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9U2-R3MM];
Arpit Gupta et al., The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization (Colum.
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 531, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=2774453 [https://perma.cc/3ENR-GMHF]; Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice:
How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Working Paper,
2016), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2777615 [https://perma.cc/7AYF-MCG2].
53. See Jones, supra note 35, at 938–45 (describing racial disparities in bail and pretrial
detention).
54. E.g., N.Y.C. Criminal Justice Agency, Annual Report 2013, at 22 (2014), http://
www.nycja.org/library.php [https://perma.cc/N8MX-34CT] (showing that in New York City,
bail was set in an amount less than $500 in 33 percent of non-felony cases and 3 percent of
felony cases).
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replicated outside the jury: nullification as a form of communal participa-
tion in everyday justice, a check on governmental actors, and a method of
resistance to larger policies and practices. I then apply these functions of
nullification to the growing phenomenon of community bail funds, arguing
that bail funds often function as a form of bail nullification. I argue that the
public nature of community bail funds makes them even more powerful
than nullification within the “black box” of the jury. As I then show in Parts
II and III, the result is that through bail nullification, community members
can not only engage in participation and resistance, they can also shift legal
meanings—including the meaning of the place of the “community” in crim-
inal procedure, and of the political and constitutional feasibility of the insti-
tution of money bail itself.
A. Jury Nullification as Community Nullification
This Section uses jury nullification as a basis for outlining a theory of
community nullification more broadly. Community nullification is a bot-
tom-up practice in which outsider members of the general public get to-
gether to intervene in important institutional decision points in everyday
criminal justice. I identify three particular powers of nullification that can be
replicated beyond the jury: the powers to inject community norms into ad-
judication,55 to serve as a check on government actors,56 and to resist larger
criminal justice practices.57 Jury nullification also has limits—it is private,
opaque, and one-time—that need not limit other forms of community nul-
lification. I set aside until Part IV the question of whether or not community
nullification is normatively desirable in our current criminal justice sys-
tem—it may, for instance, conflict with the rule of the law or with broader
efforts to change the criminal justice system. For now, my aim is to demon-
strate that community nullification can and does occur outside the jury box.
The first essential aspect of jury nullification as community nullification
is that it allows ordinary citizens to inject community norms into a process
otherwise dominated by institutional insiders.58 The immense scholarly de-
bate over jury nullification has focused especially on this participatory qual-
ity: citizens become the subjects, rather than the objects, of law creation in
55. See Abramson, supra note 2, at 147 (describing “the power [nullification] gives juries
to reflect community norms and values”).
56. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Jury Nullification Checks Prosecutorial Power, in
Criminal Law Conversations, supra note 44, at 551, 551–52 (describing jury nullification as
“one of the last remaining checks on th[e] expanding power [of prosecutors]”).
57. See Butler, supra note 2, at 681–88 (describing the power of racially based jury nulli-
fication in response to larger racial injustices in the criminal justice system).
58. See generally Bibas, supra note 40.
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the context of criminal justice.59 Having delegated power to legislators, pros-
ecutors, and judges, jurors take a little bit of power back.60 This can be excit-
ing when it promotes justice, and terrifying when employed for reasons of
prejudice or misunderstanding.61
Jury nullification also plays a storied role as a check on government
actors. This is especially true of prosecutors, who wield tremendous power
in deciding whom to charge, with what to charge them, and how to present
evidence to the jury.62 By nullifying a conviction, for example, jurors provide
a check against prosecutorial overreaching or overbroad statutes.63 They can
even improve the functioning of criminal justice, making it fairer and a bet-
ter reflection of community norms64—improvements that may be especially
welcome in the current state of mass incarceration.65 At the same time, how-
ever, critics have noted that jury nullification can also create undesirable
outcomes by decreasing the accuracy of verdicts,66 creating perverse incen-
tives for prosecutors,67 and leading to unjust results based on prejudice or
59. See Carroll, supra note 3, at 622 (arguing that nullification acts against the perception
that the state is the source of the law by “promot[ing] the opposite reality: that the power of
governance—law creation, application, and interpretation—must flow from the citizen to the
government”).
60. Id.
61. See Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2381, 2434
(1999) (“Do we call to mind the brave Massachusetts jurors of a century and a half ago who
refused to convict under the fugitive slave laws? Or do we envision white Southern juries
refusing to convict those guilty of lynching blacks?”); Lawrence Rosenthal, Confusing Cause
and Effect, in Criminal Law Conversations, supra note 44, at 569, 569–71 (arguing that in
nullifying verdicts, African Americans may actually be harming their own community).
62. See McAdams, supra note 56, at 552 (describing jury nullification as “one of the last
remaining checks on th[e] expanding power [of prosecutors]”); see also Alan W. Scheflin, Jury
Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 168, 181 (1972) (describing jury nullifica-
tion as a check on prosecutorial indiscretion); cf. Barkow, supra note 45, at 63–64 (“Not only
does [nullification] curb the authority of the judges themselves, but it also provides a check on
the legislature and executive, which both serve broader constituencies that may not have the
same interests as the jury drawn from the community.”).
63. See McAdams, supra note 56, at 552.
64. See Brown, supra note 2, at 1167–71 (arguing that some jury nullification can pro-
vide the system with “coherence or integrity that would not result from some combination of
literal statutory interpretation, inappropriate prosecution policy choices, and biased police
work”).
65. See Carol S. Steiker, Sculpting the Shape of Jury Nullification Through Jury Information
and Instruction, in Criminal Law Conversations, supra note 44, at 553, 553 (arguing that
although jury nullification may be alarming in some instances, we need nullification to
counteract the spread of mass incarceration).
66. See Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 Va. L. Rev. 253, 263–83
(1996).
67. See, e.g., Bennett Capers, On Racially-Based Jury Nullification, in Criminal Law
Conversations, supra note 44, at 576, 577 (arguing that the existence of race-based nullifica-
tion causes prosecutors to strike more African Americans from juries).
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whimsy.68 Under either view, the specter of nullification has an important
effect on the actions of prosecutors and the results of prosecutions.69
Jury nullification can also have an impact beyond an individual case,
serving as a form of resistance to larger criminal justice practices. Professor
Paul Butler has defended the phenomenon of racially based jury nullifica-
tion—when African American jurors acquit an African American defendant
because of racial critiques of the criminal justice system more broadly.70 But-
ler has argued that because a system that purports to be color-blind has in
practice had a disproportionately negative impact on the larger African
American community, a juror or group of jurors might have a moral obliga-
tion to exercise their power to say “no” to the workings of that system.71
That community nullification, in the aggregate, has the potential to “dis-
mantle the master’s house with the master’s tools”—to result in undoing the
destructive impact of overcriminalization in communities of color.72 Indeed,
the potential of jury nullification to have an impact on larger systems of
criminal justice—or criminal injustice—is part of what makes jury nullifica-
tion so powerful, and so controversial.
The power of jury nullification, however, is for the most part a hidden
power: although jurors have the legal ability to nullify, courtroom actors
cannot inform them of this ability.73 Moreover, once jurors have nullified
with an acquittal, their deliberations stay in the black box of the jury, and
cannot be reviewed on appeal.74 Indeed, the secret nature of jury nullifica-
tion means that it may be difficult to extend the beneficial effects of juror
nullification beyond individual cases.75
No form of community nullification can directly replace jury nullifica-
tion, which will always be unique because of its long history and secure place
within our constitutional framework.76 But when groups of civilians get to-
gether to resist official decisions in individual criminal cases, they may be
68. See Leipold, supra note 66, at 304–06.
69. Compare, e.g., McAdams, supra note 56, at 552 (arguing nullification has a positive
effect on prosecutors), with Leipold, supra note 66, at 281–82 (describing how the potential of
nullification might discourage plea offers or other beneficial prosecutorial actions), and Ca-
pers, supra note 67, at 577 (arguing that the existence of race-based nullification causes prose-
cutors to strike more African Americans from juries).
70. Butler, supra note 2, at 678–80.
71. Id. at 690–714.
72. Id. at 680 (quoting Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider 110 (1984)). As Butler notes,
“[m]y use [of Audre Lorde is] a corruption because Lorde states that the master’s tools can
‘never’ dismantle the master’s house.” Id. at 680 n.10 (quoting Audre Lorde, Sister Out-
sider 110 (1984)).
73. Paul Butler, Let’s Get Free: A Hip-Hop Theory of Justice 68 (2009) (describing
nullification as a “secret power of jurors”).
74. Id. at 68–71.
75. See Leipold, supra note 66, at 299–300 (“[W]hile a series of acquittals in cases involv-
ing an unpopular law might eventually provoke a legislative repeal or modification, it is hard
to believe that even multiple acquittals on the same crime would provide as much information
as a single legislative hearing or a public opinion poll.”).
76. See generally Carroll, supra note 3.
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able to perform a function analogous to that of the nullifying jury. And
when they do so, community nullification need not be a hidden power. As I
describe below, the actions of many community bail funds demonstrate that
when community nullification occurs out in the open, in public, and by
repeat players, its ability to serve as a form of resistance to larger criminal
justice practices is magnified.
B. The Rise of Community Bail Funds
Community bail funds have become a powerful presence in local crimi-
nal courthouses around the United States, posting bail for defendants who
would otherwise remain in pretrial detention pending the resolution of their
cases. The recent evolution of these bail funds has disrupted the entrenched
procedures of “bail” in everyday criminal cases. Historically, bail is the pro-
cess of releasing a criminal defendant from pretrial custody with conditions
for ensuring a defendant’s return to court.77 The most common of these
conditions is money bail: a requirement that a defendant pay all or part of a
sum of money before she is released; if the defendant returns to court, then
the court returns the bail money, usually after taking a percentage of it as a
fee or surcharge.78 A judge or magistrate makes the initial bail-setting deci-
sion, and after a wave of reform in the 1970s and 1980s, most jurisdictions
now also give a judge the ability to set bail or detain a defendant pretrial in
order to protect “community safety.”79
Although the original purpose of bail was to facilitate release, today the
result of the setting of money bail is the pretrial detention of hundreds of
thousands of defendants at any one time for the sole reason that they cannot
afford to pay their own bail.80 In low-level cases, these defendants often face
a choice: plead guilty and go home, or fight the case and stay in jail. Pretrial
detention is a destabilizing force for defendants, their families, and their
neighbors, resulting in lost wages, jobs, homes, and child custody. It also
leads to longer sentences and increased risk of future arrests and convic-
tions.81 Moreover, the results of the bail-setting decision have a dispropor-
tionately negative impact on communities of color, and stark disparities in
bail outcomes persist between white defendants and African American and
Latino defendants.82 Even when defendants are able to post bail, doing so
77. Pretrial Justice Inst., Glossary of Terms and Phrases Relating to Bail and
the Pretrial Release or Detention Decision 2 (2015) http://www.pretrial.org/download/
pji-reports/Glossary%20of%20Terms%20%28July%202015%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWG5-
ZTHY].
78. See id. at 2.
79. See Gouldin, supra note 35.
80. See sources cited supra note 51.
81. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
82. See Jones, supra note 35, at 941–45. For example, one study found that, controlling
for a variety of legal and extralegal factors, African American defendants are 66 percent more
likely than white defendants to be in pretrial detention and Latino defendants are 91 percent
more likely to be in pretrial detention. See Stephen DeMuth, Racial and Ethnic Differences in
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often requires the assistance of commercial bail bondsmen, who take a
nonrefundable cut of the money in exchange for posting bail and are notori-
ous for their predatory practices.83
Community bail funds intervene at this crucial moment in a criminal
case by paying bail for defendants out of a revolving fund, with the goal of
moving towards larger changes in local criminal justice practices. Although
the payment of a defendant’s money bail can come from a host of different
sources—family members and friends, commercial bondsmen, crowd-
sourced individual bail funds—what distinguishes community bail funds is
that they are connected to bottom-up movements for change and post bail
for multiple defendants over an extended period of time using a rotating
pool of money. Community groups and churches have long had a practice of
passing a hat to collect funds to help people with bail and legal defense, but
formal charitable bail funds—formed expressly for the purpose of posting
bail—have taken off nationally only in the last five years.84 Most bail funds
consist of a revolving pool of money: a bail fund posts bail for someone, and
if that defendant returns to court the bail fund receives the money back; the
fund can then use that money anew.85 A community bail fund’s interest in a
defendant’s case stems not from personal connections to that defendant, but
rather from broader beliefs regarding the overuse of pretrial detention
among particular neighborhoods, racial or socioeconomic groups, or politi-
cal organizations.86
Consider the following examples:
• In the Bronx, New York, since 2012 the Bronx Freedom Fund has bailed
out over 300 individuals charged with misdemeanors who cannot afford
Pretrial Release Decisions and Outcomes: A Comparison of Hispanic, Black, and White Felony
Arrestees, 41 Criminology 873, 880–82 (2003).
83. See generally Justice Policy Inst., For Better or For Profit: How the Bail
Bond Industry Stands in the Way of Fair and Effective Pretrial Justice (2012), http://
www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/_for_better_or_for_profit_.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/U4HZ-CXBN].
84. Precursors to current community bail funds include a bail fund set up by the Civil
Rights Congress in the 1950s to post bail for accused communities and bail funds run by
Catholic charities and other religious institutions. See, e.g., Arthur J. Sabin, In Calmer
Times: The Supreme Court and Red Monday 49–50 (1999) (describing bail fund set up by
the Civil Rights Congress); Zach Ezor, Sister Sue, The Nun at the County Jail, WBUR News
(Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.wbur.org/2015/02/26/kind-world-sister-sue [http://perma.cc/
P7US-PWCV] (profiling a nun who administers a longstanding bail fund); Brady Faith
Center Ministries, http://bradyfaithcenter.org/ministries/ [https://perma.cc/MJ5X-32KF]
(describing the Brady Faith Center’s Jail Ministry).
85. See, e.g., How It Works, Mass. Bail Fund, http://www.massbailfund.org/how-it-
works.html [https://perma.cc/G99C-BHC8] (“Bail is a renewable resource. Once bail is re-
turned your money can be used to post bail for the next person . . . .”).
86. See, e.g., Bail: A Costly Injustice, Brooklyn Cmty. Bail Fund, http://www.brooklyn
bailfund.org [https://perma.cc/V5YZ-JDY2] (“90% [of people in our jail because they can’t
pay bail] are Black or Hispanic. Their poverty alone imprisons them. The result is two systems
of criminal justice: one for those who have and one for those who do not.”).
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their bail.87 The Freedom Fund receives referrals from attorneys at the
Bronx Defenders, a public defender office, and then pays bail in misde-
meanor cases in amounts up to $2,000. Their website states: “We exist
to level the playing field by providing bail assistance to people charged
with low-level offenses who can’t afford to pay for their freedom.”88 Bail
funds modeled on or inspired by the Bronx Freedom Fund have been
replicated in Massachusetts, Brooklyn, Nashville, and Connecticut.89
• In Baltimore in 2015, local activists protesting police violence in the
wake of the death of Freddie Gray established the “Baltimore Protesters
Bail Bond Fund” to pay the bail of those arrested while protesting police
violence.90 The Baltimore bail fund models itself after the jail support
model of the Ferguson Legal Defense Committee91 set up in 2014 asso-
ciation with The Movement for Black Lives. Similar funds have ap-
peared in Oakland, Cleveland, Raleigh-Durham, and Baton Rouge, each
of which posts bail for individuals who are arrested while protesting or
who are part of a movement against police violence.92
87. See The Bronx Freedom Fund, Second Annual Report 2 (2015), http://static1.
squarespace.com/static/54e106e1e4b05fac69f108cf/t/5681561eb204d52319b86854/1451316766
890/2015+Annual+Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/7Y96-T2AZ]. This is the second iteration of
the Bronx Freedom Fund, the first iteration of which existed from 2007 to 2009, “posting bail
for 120 Bronx residents before a judge declared it illegal a [sic] nonprofit to post bail on a
defendant’s behalf.” Denis Slattery, Get Out of Jail Free, Courtesy of Bronx Fund, N.Y. Daily
News (Oct. 31, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/jail-free-cour-
tesy-bronx-fund-article-1.1503164 (on file with the Michigan Law Review). During that first
experiment, “93% of the program’s clients showed up for every subsequent court date, and
54% had their cases dismissed.” Id.; see also infra notes 128–129 and accompanying text.
88. The Bronx Freedom Fund, http://www.thebronxfreedomfund.org [http://perma.cc/
NT7K-WNJB].
89. See Sledge, supra note 9 (describing launch of Brooklyn Community Bail Fund in
conjunction with local public defender office Brooklyn Defender Services); The Massachusetts
Bail Fund, Classy.org, https://www.classy.org/events/massachussetts-bail-fund/e75475
[https://perma.cc/WCP4-2L6G]; Sells, supra note 10 (describing Just City’s Nashville Bail
Fund); Qi Xu, New Fund Combats “Wealth-Based Jailing”, New Haven Indep. (Jun. 23, 2016,
1:24 PM), http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/CT_bail_fund/
[http://perma.cc/9FAK-9XSS] (describing the process of launching the Connecticut Bail
Fund).
90. The bail fund was founded to raise money for an 18-year-old whose bail was set at
$500,000 after he smashed a police windshield during a protest. After the boy was released,
movement activists converted the fund into a larger bail fund. See German Lopez, Man Who
Smashed Police Car Faces Higher Bail than Cop who Allegedly Murdered Freddie Gray, Vox.com
(May 2, 2015, 10:05 AM), http://www.vox.com/2015/5/2/8534943/baltimore-bail-freddie-gray
(on file with the Michigan Law Review) (describing initial bail fund for Allen Bullock); Rich-
ardson, supra note 15.
91. In Ferguson, Missouri, activists associated with the Movement for Black Lives
founded the Ferguson Defense Committee in 2014. Within the first year, the Defense Commit-
tee had raised over $300,000 toward legal defense of protesters and paid bail bonds for more
than 200 people. See Gott, supra note 14.
92. See, e.g., Workneh, supra note 18; Bay Area Anti-Repression Committee Bail Fund,
supra note 17; Erste, supra note 16 (website of bail fund for activists who are arrested during
protests associated with the deaths of Tamir Rice and Tanisha Anderson); Freedom Fighter
Bond Fund, Durham Solidarity Ctr., http://durhamsolidaritycenter.org/bondfund/ [https://
perma.cc/QYP8-5RGT]; Jail and Court Support Updates, Bay Area Anti-Repression Comm.,
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• In Chicago, 2015 saw the founding of the Chicago Community Bond
Fund, which pays bond in criminal court for Chicagoans who cannot
afford to pay their bail. Although the primary mission of this all-volun-
teer fund is to administer the revolving bail fund, it also has a mission
of organizing for larger change alongside “people most directly im-
pacted by criminalization and policing: people of color, especially Black
people, and the poor.”93 In December 2015, the Chicago Community
Bail Fund received local media attention when it bailed out a woman
accused of killing her husband and abuser by raising more than
$35,000.94
• In Queens, New York, a coalition of community groups formed the
Lorena Borjas Community Fund in 2009. The fund began as a reaction
to New York Police Department “sweeps” of a particular neighborhood
of Queens known for prostitution, which resulted in mass arrests of
Trans Latina women, many of them sex workers.95 The all-volunteer
fund works to pay or raise money for bail for “transgender women of
color . . . who because of systemic discrimination and profiling, are less
likely to be able to pay bail and face particularly harsh abuses while
incarcerated.”96
These community bail funds all administer a revolving pool of money
that they use to post bail for defendants—strangers—out of a dedication to
a larger charitable or political mission. But the methods of these community
bail funds differ substantially. Three dimensions of difference stand out as
particularly important in thinking through the function of community bail
funds within local criminal justice systems.
https://antirepressionbayarea.com/category/jail-and-court-support/ [https://perma.cc/3SVR-N
HWH].
93. See Chi. Comm. Bond Fund, supra note 12. The Community Bond Fund has devel-
oped a list of criteria to use to evaluate whether to pay someone’s bond, including the amount
of bond to be paid, the risk of the individual being victimized in jail, and the person’s existing
support system—as well as the defendant’s “position in relation to structural violence, com-
munity disinvestment, systemic racism, survival, and resistance.” Id.
94. See Jonah Newman, A Community Solution to Cash Bail, Chi. Reporter (Jan. 13,
2016), http://chicagoreporter.com/a-community-solution-to-cash-bail/ [http://perma.cc/J7CK
-5VFF]; Alex Nitkin, Naomi Freeman, Mom in Jail for Killing Abuser, Released on Bond: Advo-
cates, DNAInfo (December 24, 2015, 11:22 AM), https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/
20151224/north-lawndale/naomi-freeman-mom-jail-for-killing-abuser-released-thursday-ad
vocates (on file with the Michigan Law Review); #FreeNaomiFreeman, Chi. Cmty. Bond
Fund, https://chicagobond.org/free_naomi_freeman/index.html [https://perma.cc/J4CR-DP6
R].
95. See Corte´s, supra note 11 (describing the founding of the Fund); Chase Strangio,
Why Bail Reform Should be an LGBT Movement Priority, Huffington Post (July 20, 2015,
3:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chase-strangio/why-bail-reform-should-be-an-
lgbt-movement-priority_b_7739166.html [http://perma.cc/F6CQ-E2NY].
96. Chase Strangio & Rage M. Kidvai, Support Black Trans Women Fight for Survival,
Sylvia Rivera Law Project (Aug. 15, 2015) http://srlp.org/support-black-trans-women-
fight-for-survival/ [https://perma.cc/FX57-D644] (“The [Lorena Borjas Community] fund ex-
ists precisely to support transgender women of color . . . who because of systemic discrimina-
tion and profiling, are less likely to be able to pay bail and face particularly harsh abuses while
incarcerated.”).
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First, community bail funds vary in their decisionmaking processes, in
who decides when to post bail and based on what criteria. Some bail funds
have a formal, public list of criteria that they use to assess possible cases in
which to intervene—criteria that can include, for example, a defendant’s
community connections, their warrant history, their connection to popula-
tions disproportionately affected by mass incarceration, or their vulnerabil-
ity to violence in jail.97 In contrast, other bail funds keep their referral and
decisionmaking processes close to the chest. Some bail funds have instituted
a group decisionmaking process, making sure that a range of stakeholders—
including formerly incarcerated individuals—are involved in deciding for
whom to post bail.98 Other bail funds have more of a top-down model of
decisionmaking, in which staff members or leaders decide on their own
based on preexisting criteria. These variations in decisionmaking processes
are important because they reveal the different ways in which bail funds may
be pushing against (or not) established criteria for pretrial detention, and
disrupting (or not) the power of elites to decide who goes free and who
remains in jail pending disposition.99
Second, bail funds offer different stances toward defendants for whom
they have posted bail. After posting bail for defendants, the involvement of
bail funds can vary from frequent and substantive contact, including coun-
seling and legal support, to minimal assistance with rides to court and re-
minder phone calls. Some bail funds provide a wide range of social and
charitable services, such as drug treatment and job referrals to individuals
with pending cases.100 Others focus instead on involving these individuals in
local social movements aimed at changing criminal justice practices, some-
times even conditioning money bail on fidelity to a movement.101 Some bail
funds exert deliberate and sustained pressure on defendants to return to
court, while others support defendants without pressuring them to return to
97. E.g., Bronx Freedom Fund, supra note 8, at 2 (“[W]e screen our clients using strict
criteria that take into account an individual’s ties to the community, history of court appear-
ances, and existence of family or other primary contact person, among other factors.”); Chi.
Cmty. Bond Fund, supra note 12 (listing eleven criteria that it uses to decide for whom to
post bond, including amount of bond, inability to pay, existing support system, potential for
victimization in jail, and “[p]osition in relation to structural violence, community disinvest-
ment, systemic racism, survival, and resistance”); see also Mass. Bail Fund, supra note 85
(describing how the fund uses “a scoring tool to assess the applicants’ situation, taking into
account all relevant aspects of their case and life,” but listing no further details).
98. See, e.g., Xu, supra note 89 (describing this approach with the Connecticut Bail
Fund).
99. A public defender office, for example, may very well be taking the decisionmaking
power away from elite judges and prosecutors, but without input from affected populations
the bail fund may itself be dominated by elite decisionmakers.
100. See, e.g., How it Works, Brooklyn Cmty. Bail Fund, http://www.brooklynbail
fund.org/how-it-works-page [http://perma.cc/4KE3-8GBB] (“Fund clients will have access to
re-entry support, such as social workers, immigration attorneys, education and employment
lawyers and housing and benefits experts.”).
101. See, e.g., Freedom Fighter Bond Fund, supra note 92 (describing how recipients of bail
fund money are asked to abide by a statement of unity with the fund).
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court or engage in any particular conduct. These different attitudes toward
defendants and the range of services offered to them can in turn affect the
relationship between the bail fund and the criminal justice system within
which it operates.
Third, community bail funds vary in their mission; although bail funds
are invariably connected to a discrete mission related to larger beliefs about
the criminal justice system, these missions can look very different. In Queens
and Chicago, for instance, bail funds grew directly out of minority commu-
nities who felt targeted by local policing practices.102 Bail funds affiliated
with the Movement for Black Lives sprouted up to support protesters, shift-
ing over time to focus on the role of the money bail system in perpetuating
inequality and funding local courts.103 And bail funds associated with public
defender offices grew out of frustration with the inability of their indigent
clients to make any true “choices” when confronted with indefinite pretrial
detention because of inability to pay bail.104 Many community bail funds aim
to make a powerful statement about the use of money bail in their local
courthouses by posting bail for multiple defendants over a period of time.105
As one advocate getting ready to open a fund in Nashville told me: “It says
everything we need to say with a very simple tool of just laying down cash
on the counter.”106 Others, in contrast, attempt to operate somewhat under
the radar of mainstream court operations, with the purpose of internally
strengthening their social movements aimed at larger change.
These three dimensions of difference in how community bail funds op-
erate—variations in decisionmaking processes, stances toward defendants,
and larger missions for change—mean that there is no one way to character-
ize community bail funds’ impact on and relationship to local criminal jus-
tice. These differences also help demonstrate how some community bail
102. See Newman, supra note 94 (describing how the Chicago Community Bond Fund
grew out of reactions to police shootings of people of color in Chicago); Interview with Chase
Strangio, Founder, Lorena Borjas Cmt. Fund, in New York, NY (Aug 5, 2015) (describing the
origins of the Lorena Borjas Community Fund in the fight against the overcriminalization of
trans women of color).
103. See, e.g., Gott, supra note 14 (describing the origins of the bail fund in the response
to protests in the weeks after the killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson); Richardson, supra
note 15 (describing the origins of the Baltimore Protesters Bail Bond Fund in protests against
police violence in Baltimore).
104. See, e.g., Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. Times (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (“Every
year, thousands of innocent people are sent to jail only because they can’t afford to post bail,
putting them at risk of losing their jobs, custody of their children—even their lives.”); id.
(describing the founding of the Brooklyn Community Bail Fund in response to cases of clients
of the Brooklyn Defender Service); Slattery, supra note 87 (describing the second iteration of
the Bronx Freedom Fund).
105. See, e.g., Pinto, supra note 104 (discussing how one bail fund program helped bail
out nearly 200 defendants and, in doing so, illustrated that bail makes poor people who would
otherwise win their cases plead guilty).
106. Telephone Interview with Josh Spickler, Executive Director, Just City, and Sarah
Smith, Law Student Volunteer, Just City (Jan. 7, 2016).
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funds may serve a function akin to community nullification, while others
may serve more of a legitimating function, helping the bail system operate
more smoothly rather than sparking large-scale change. Still, something es-
sential unites these disparate practices: they involve local groups posting bail
for multiple defendants over a period of time, connected to a larger set of
beliefs or purposes beyond securing the freedom of those individuals.
This connection between community bail funds and larger movements
for change makes them different in kind from the common phenomenon of
crowdfunding bail for individual defendants. At any one time, there are
thousands of GoFundMe.com campaigns107 by individuals and their families
asking for help with bail or legal defense.108 These one-off bail funds, while
an interesting phenomenon, do not qualify as community bail funds or as
bail nullification. With crowdfunded bail, the defendant or the family who
actually posts the bail raises the money. The money belongs to the family,
and is not returned to a revolving fund that will then post bail for other
defendants—there is no expectation of return or of long-term connection to
a community group. There is no broader cause.
This distinction between crowdfunded bail and a community bail fund
is complicated, though, when the crowdfunded bail is raised in a high-pro-
file prosecution or is connected to a larger cause. Consider, for example, the
bail fund associated with the defense of George Zimmerman, accused of
murdering 17-year-old Trayvon Martin. After a judge set $150,000 bond in
Zimmerman’s case,109 Fox News host Sean Hannity nightly encouraged
viewers to visit a website raising funds to help George Zimmerman with his
legal costs, including his bail.110 Zimmerman’s family eventually paid the
bail with those crowdsourced funds.111 When advocating contributions to
Zimmerman’s fund on Fox News, Hannity invoked the right to bear arms
and the right of self-defense, emphasizing that larger ideas of justice were at
stake in the case.112 This rare example where an individual bail fund drew
107. GoFundMe and other crowdfunding online platforms allow individuals to raise
money in small increments from a large number of individuals to pay for particular causes,
events, or challenges. See, e.g., How it Works, GoFundMe.com, https://www.gofundme.com/
tour [https://perma.cc/2T56-9V26].
108. See Amanda Robb, George Zimmerman, Darren Wilson and the Kickstarted Defense:
You Call This Justice?, Guardian (Oct. 1, 2014, 7:45 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/com
mentisfree/2014/oct/01/george-zimmerman-darren-wilson-crowd-sourced-legal-fees [https://
perma.cc/KC4U-39NT].
109. CNN Wire Staff, Zimmerman Released After Posting Bail, CNN (July 6, 2012, 7:45
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/06/justice/florida-teen-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/Y4LP-
J9HC].
110. Robb, supra note 108.
111. These funds came from public support and then became the reason that the judge
revoked the bail and raised it to a million dollars—which Zimmerman also paid with public
support. See Elizabeth Chuck & James Novogrod, Florida Judge Sets Bond at $1 Million for
George Zimmerman, NBC News (July 5, 2012, 6:55 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/
2012/07/05/12579030-florida-judge-sets-bond-at-1-million-for-george-zimmerman [https://
perma.cc/H5QC-Z2YN].
112. See Robb, supra note 108.
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public attention and debate over larger criminal justice issues stands some-
where between simple crowdfunded bail and a community bail fund. For the
purposes of the discussion of nullification below, however, I focus on an
idealized type of community bail fund that is local, organized, connected to
larger bottom-up movements for change, and posts bail for multiple defend-
ants over a period of time.
When the “community” posts bail from a revolving, long-term bail
fund, it takes the pretrial decisionmaking power away from powerful insid-
ers—judges, magistrates, or bondsmen. Instead, an outsider organization
can nullify an insider decision by independently determining whether some-
one merits release pending trial, using whatever criteria they choose. When
they perform this act for multiple defendants, over time it becomes a larger
expression of the community’s stake in local criminal justice. In the next
Section, I consider the ways in which these practices can at times function as
a form of community nullification.
C. Bail Nullification
When a community bail fund posts bail, the act can take on important
qualities that mirror those of jury nullification: a group of citizens comes
together to make a decision about an individual criminal case, and that deci-
sion impacts not only that case but also larger systems of power and justice.
Like jury nullification, the community’s decision can undo, or nullify, a dis-
cretionary decision that official actors have made. Like jury nullification,
that communal intervention can disrupt the legal status quo and undermine
the power of institutional actors who otherwise control most of the criminal
justice process. And, like jury nullification, this can go wrong113—groups
may post bail for reasons we don’t like, or for people who we don’t think
should be free pending trial. Community bail funds thus have the potential
to serve the crucial functions of community nullification: to reject an official
result or decision, and, in the process, to inject community input, check
government actors, and resist larger criminal justice practices. Community
bail funds do not always engage in bail nullification.  But when they do,
their intervention may be most powerful when the community bail fund is
one that gives the decisionmaking power to members of traditionally power-
less populations who interact most frequently with the criminal justice
system.
Community bail funds intervene at a paradigmatic moment of judicial
discretion, when a judge or magistrate decides whether to release a defen-
dant, to detain her without bail, or—as they do in the majority of cases—to
specify an amount of money that a defendant must pay to be released while
the case is pending.114 The traditional idea of money bail is that an individ-
ual’s appearance in court is guaranteed by a surety, someone with close ties
113. Cf. Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 125, 146
(“[H]istory also gives us its share of revolting instances [of jury nullification].”).
114. See Eaglin & Solomon, supra note 50, at 19 (“Nationally, 61 percent of all defend-
ants [are] required to post financial bail for their release.”).
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to the defendant—a defendant thus returns to court because she does not
want a court to confiscate her brother’s savings or a bail bondsman to claim
possession of her mother’s house.115 But when a community bail fund posts
bail for a defendant who comes back to court, without having committed
any criminal acts in the meantime, it may show that the judge was wrong
that a certain amount of personal or family money needed to be on the line
for that individual to come back to court and stay out of trouble. And when
bail funds post bail, defendants do come back: community bail funds in
Massachusetts, the Bronx, and Brooklyn all report that over multiple years,
over 90 percent of defendants for whom they post bail return to court.116
Community bail funds thus call into question the conceptual origin of
money bail: that only a threat to the economic security of a close relation or
friend is a compelling incentive for most defendants to return to court.117
The power of community bail funds goes a crucial step beyond nullify-
ing the pretrial decision; by posting bail, community bail funds can in some
cases nullify convictions and sentences as well. For, as actors inside the crim-
inal justice system know well, the pretrial decision has a profound effect on
the eventual outcome of a criminal case.118 Most centrally, the setting of bail
beyond what an individual can pay—or even the looming threat of such
bail—incentivizes a defendant to plead guilty so as to receive a sentence of
less time than they would serve while waiting out their case.119 Moreover, a
defendant incarcerated pretrial, all else being equal, is much more likely to
115. See Baradaran, supra note 29, at 733. See generally Schnacke, supra note 32, at 28
(describing historical origins of the personal surety). Bail bondsmen often serve as an interme-
diary in this process. See id. at 38–39.
116. Bronx Freedom Fund, supra note 87, at 2; Brooklyn Cmty Bail Fund, 2015–2016
Annual Report 9 (2016), http://www.brooklynbailfund.org/2015-annual-report [http://
perma.cc/Z8TM-CTYN] (“95% of clients return for all required court appearances . . . .”);
Massachusetts Bail Fund: Campaign Details, Classy.org, https://www.classy.org/events/Massa
chusetts-bail-fund/e75475 [https://perma.cc/WCP4-2L6G] (“Over 90% of our clients come
back to court as required.”).
117. This premise has also been undermined by studies demonstrating that posting
money bail does not increase the chances that a defendant will return to court. See, e.g.,
Claire M.B. Brooker et al., Pretrial Justice Inst., The Jefferson County Bail Project
7 (2014), http://www.pretrial.org/download/pji-reports/Jeffersion%20County%20Bail%20Pro-
ject-%20Impact%20Study%20-%20PJI%202014.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6Y8-RVHH] (finding
no significant difference in appearance or public safety rates for defendants released on money
bail compared to defendants released without having to pay money); see also Schnacke, supra
note 32, at 25 (“[E]ver since 1968, when the American Bar Association openly questioned the
basic premise that money serves as a motivator for court appearance, no valid study has been
conducted to refute that uncertainty.”).
118. See Justice Policy Inst., supra note 24 at 25 (noting that judges, prosecutors, and
defense attorneys all approach the bail-setting decision knowing that it will affect future pleas).
119. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text; see also Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent
People Plead Guilty, N.Y. Rev. Books, Nov. 20, 2014, at 16 (describing bail as one reason that
innocent people plead guilty).
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receive a sentence of jail or prison than an otherwise similarly situated de-
fendant.120 Even a few days in jail are profoundly destabilizing: defendants
experience declines in physical and mental health, and potentially lose
wages, jobs, stable housing, and custody of their children. This, in turn,
leads to more disruptions to families and neighborhoods than would occur
if a defendant were released without bail.121 So when a community bail fund
posts bail, the fund may be nullifying not simply the bail-setting decision,
but also the likely reality that follows from bail being set beyond a defen-
dant’s capacity to pay: a guilty plea and a jail sentence. By doing this, a
nullifying bail fund may be intervening at a more important point than a
nullifying jury does, for money bail is set in the majority of criminal cases,
while trials occur for only a few.122
Community bail funds thus serve as a check on judges and prosecutors,
who may be facilitating the use of bail for more than its ostensible purpose.
Judges, when setting bail for an indigent defendant, know full well that bail
can serve to incarcerate the defendant for the remainder of their case. A
California judge admitted this to a journalist as recently as June 2015, saying
“bail is really being set to keep the person in custody. You have to kind of
concede that, . . . [even though] it’s not supposed to be that.”123 Since the
mid –twentieth century, studies of judicial decisionmaking in the bail con-
text have continually found a widespread practice of “sub rosa” pretrial de-
tention, in which judges sometimes set bail with the knowledge that a
defendant cannot afford to post it.124 And prosecutors, in turn, have an in-
centive to request high bail to ensure leverage over plea bargaining negotia-
tions.125 When a community bail fund posts bail, especially in a low-level
120. See, e.g., Lowenkamp et al., supra note 52, at 10. When defendants held pretrial are
sentenced to jail or prison, they also tend to receive longer jail or prison sentences than defend-
ants similarly situated who were released pretrial. Id. at 10, 14–15, 18–19; see also sources cited
supra note 52 (collecting studies).
121. See Justice Policy Inst., supra note 24, at 14, 26.
122. See id. at 10, 26.
123. Shaila Dewan, When Bail Is Out of Defendant’s Reach, Other Costs Mount, N.Y. Times
(June 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/11/us/when-bail-is-out-of-defendants-
reach-other-costs-mount.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
124. See Roy B. Flemming, Punishment Before Trial: An Organizational Perspec-
tive of Felony Bail Processes 18 (1982) (describing how a judge setting bail and worrying
about future criminal conduct may be thinking, “how large a bail will assure his detention
while still not appearing excessive or unreasonable?”); Ronald Goldfarb, Ransom: A Cri-
tique of the American Bail System 46–49 (1965) (describing the widespread practice of
setting bail so as to give defendants “a taste of jail”); Wayne H. Thomas, Jr., Bail Reform in
America 245–46 (1976) (describing tacit understanding of “sub rosa” pretrial detention by
setting bail higher than defendants can pay); Caleb Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court:
Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031, 1037–43 (1954); see also Wise-
man, supra note 37, at 465 (discussing skewed incentives judges face to set bail).
125. Justice Policy Inst., supra note 24, at 25 (“Prosecutors can and often do ask judges
for pretrial detention as leverage in plea-bargaining discussions with people of limited finan-
cial resources.”); cf. Samuel Walker, Taming the System: The Control of Discretion in
Criminal Justice 1950–1990, at 58 (1993) (“Virtually all studies of bail have found that the
prosecutor is the dominant nonjudicial figure in the bail-setting process.”); Bibas, supra note
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case that would otherwise receive a sentence other than jail time,126 the fund
is outing the reality that people experience on the ground—that when bail is
set, the choice of whether or not to plead guilty is taken away. Bail nullifica-
tion becomes not just an act of intervention, but also one of resistance.
The fact that institutional actors bristle—and retaliate—when commu-
nity bail funds post bail demonstrates the power this act of resistance wields.
The history of the Bronx Freedom Fund in particular provides a potent ex-
ample of judicial retaliation against a community bail fund. The Freedom
Fund initially began operations in 2007, before there was an official law in
New York State providing for the existence of charitable bail funds. Working
in conjunction with the Bronx Defenders, a public defender office, the Free-
dom Fund posted bail for more than 130 clients in just under two years.127
But these acts did not sit well with local judges, whose decisionmaking
power was taken away when the Freedom Fund posted bail for defendants
who would otherwise remain incarcerated pretrial. One judge, in particular,
was angry enough to shut down the fund entirely. When the judge witnessed
an indigent man walk into the courtroom on his own, even though he had
been detained on $3,000 bail, the judge declared loudly to the courtroom:
“He says he never worked, has no source of income. . . . [W]here is the
money coming from?”128 Even though bail had served its purpose—the de-
fendant appeared in court voluntarily, and had harmed no one in the in-
terim—the presiding judge was irate. The bail fund had eviscerated the
judicial power to incarcerate a defendant pending trial. The judge proceeded
to investigate the workings of the Freedom Fund, preside over a series of
hearings and ultimately shut the Freedom Fund down as a violation of the
state’s insurance laws.129
This strong, public judicial opposition to a community bail fund dem-
onstrates the power of bail funds as a form of resistance. That resistance not
23, at 2470–71 (“Trials are much more time consuming than plea bargains, so prosecutors
have incentives to negotiate deals instead of trying cases.”).
126. Misdemeanors constitute the vast majority of prosecutions in state court. See
Natapoff, supra note 47, at 1320 (cataloguing evidence that misdemeanors account for at least
eighty percent of new state criminal cases each year).
127. Nick Pinto, Making Bail Better, Village Voice (Oct. 10, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://
www.villagevoice.com/2012-10-10/news/making-bail-better/full/ [https://perma.cc/5PLX-
GLEX] (describing the first iteration of the Bronx Freedom Fund and stating that they posted
bail for nearly 200 people between 2007 and 2009).
128. Email from Robyn Mar, Attorney for Mr. Miranda, Bronx Defs., to Jocelyn Simonson
(Aug. 30, 2016) (on file with author); see also Andrea Clisura, Note, None of Their Business:
The Need for Another Alternative to New York’s Bail Bond Business, 19 J.L. & Pol’y 307, 326–30
(2010) (describing the case of People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 WL 2170254 (Bronx
Cty. Sup. Ct. June 22, 2009)); Pinto, supra note 127 (describing Miranda and the judge’s
reaction).
129. See People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 WL 2170254, at *1 (Bronx Cty. Sup.
Ct. June 22, 2009) (“The Bronx Freedom Fund has posted bail for more that [sic] 130 Bronx
Defenders’ clients. Because the corporation has become a ‘bail bond business’ as well as an
‘insurance business’ as defined in Insurance Law § 6801, it had to be licensed.”).
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only inserts community input into the bail-setting decision, but also un-
earths publicly some of the injustices of the money bail system—for in-
stance, the link between a defendant’s wealth and pretrial status, and the
impact of pretrial detention on communities of color. By doing so, bail nul-
lification, like jury nullification, has the potential to do what Professor Paul
Butler has described as “dismantl[ing] the master’s house with the master’s
tools.”130 Butler describes his hope for change via jury nullification this way:
“I hope that there are enough of us out there, fed up with prison as the
answer to black desperation and white supremacy, to cause retrial after re-
trial, until, finally, the United States ‘retries’ its idea of justice.”131 As I dis-
cuss in more detail in the next two Parts, there is evidence that something
like this may already happening with community bail funds and bail: by
publicly demonstrating the links between poverty and outcomes in criminal
cases over time, bail funds have been part of a shift in the public conversa-
tion around bail.132 This conversation, in turn, has led to some tangible
changes in local laws, policies, and practices.133 Community bail funds can
use the master’s tools—money bail—to chip away at the fac¸ade of the
master’s house. As a result, when bail funds publicly connect their actions to
larger efforts to push back against the system of money bail, they can and
often do court controversy and spark change.
With community bail funds, individual acts can add up to an assertion
of popular input into the contours of the criminal justice system writ large.
A quick, crowdsourced fund to bail out an individual may not serve any
larger purpose—it may even do society a disservice by releasing someone
dangerous. While there is no guarantee that each community bail fund deci-
sion will be a beneficial one, the fact that bail funds engage in their practice
over time, gaining expertise and frequently publishing their results, means
that their significance transcends the freedom of any one defendant. The
communal input supplied by these bail funds is especially notable because it
occurs at a moment in the criminal process where there are no other oppor-
tunities for input from the community.134 Moreover, the input comes from a
population that generally has little political power to influence the criminal
justice system more broadly.135 Ultimately bail funds may be returning the
130. Butler, supra note 2, at 680 (referencing Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider 110
(1984)).
131. Id. at 724–25.
132. See infra Section II.C.
133. See infra Section III.A.
134. Recognizing this participatory gap, Professor Laura Appleman has argued that we
should empanel formal bail juries to assist judges in making bail determinations. See Ap-
pleman, supra note 29, at 1355–59. Community bail funds are in many ways like these hypo-
thetical juries would be, but they operate outside of the system, on their own terms.
135. Cf. Brown, supra note 2, at 1171–93 (distinguishing between forms of jury nullifica-
tion based on the reasons for that nullification); Butler, supra note 2 (claiming that jury nulli-
fication has greater moral legitimacy when it is done by African Americans); see also
Simonson, supra note 5, at 2184–90 (discussing the power of participation from marginalized
groups with little input into the criminal justice system).
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bail function to the community at large—a return that harks back to the
origins of bail, when entire Norman clans would vouch for the return of
their community members,136 and to colonial times in America, when chari-
table strangers would post surety for defendants and ensure their return to
court.137
Rather than amplify the importance of an institution of popular partici-
pation that already exists, such as a jury, the act of bail nullification can
elevate a mundane procedural practice into an important communal act.
Some of the differences between bail nullification and jury nullification ac-
tually strengthen the function of community bail funds as a method of bot-
tom-up resistance to larger criminal justice policies and practices. Bail funds
possess a key feature that nullifying juries do not: their actions are public.138
Moreover, unlike juries, bail funds involve repeat players. Because the same
actors are doing the actions over and over again, these repeat players—the
administrators of the bail fund itself—can publicize what they are doing and
make explicit public connections between their actions and their larger be-
liefs about the fairness of the criminal justice system.139 Bail nullification
therefore has powers that are only hinted at by jury nullification—powers to
publicly contest understandings of community in the world of criminal pro-
cedure, and powers to engage in demosprudence, whereby collective action
by social-movement actors contributes to broader legal change.140 The next
two Parts flesh out two of the most powerful aspects of the public nature of
bail nullification: the rhetorical power to redefine the role of the community
in the setting of bail, and the demosprudential power to engage with the law
of bail on the ground.
136. See Elsa de Haas, Antiquities of Bail: Origin and Historical Development in
Criminal Cases to the Year 1275, at 30–51 (1966) (describing the system of frankenpledge,
in which entire Norman clans vouched for the return of individuals to court).
137. See, e.g., John Augustus, A Report of the Labors of John Augustus: First Pro-
bation Officer 4–6 (1852) (describing the first man in Massachusetts to post surety for a
stranger with a promise that he would ensure his return to court). Although known as
America’s “first probation officer,” Augustus really served the function that we might attribute
today to a bail bondsman—but he did so out of a sense of charity rather than for profit. By
1858, Augustus had bailed 1,946 individuals, and he continued his work until his death in
1859. See Sheldon Glueck, Foreword, in A Report of the Labors of John Augustus: First
Probation Officer, supra, at v–vi.
138. See Allison Orr Larsen, Bargaining Inside the Black Box, 99 Geo. L.J. 1567, 1572–73
(2011) (“Courts are adamant about protecting the mystery and secrecy of ‘the black box’; jury
discussions are among the most private and privileged in our legal system.”).
139. In this way, community bail funds are inherently different than the other repeat
players in the world of money bail, bail bondsmen, who post bail over a period of time for
reasons of profit.
140. Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Towards a Demosprudence of
Law and Social Movements, 123 Yale L.J. 2740, 2750, 2757–58 (2014) (“[D]emosprudence
focuses on the ways that ongoing collective action by ordinary people can permanently . . .
chang[e] the people who make the law and the landscape in which that law is made.”).
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II. Redefining Community in the Setting of Bail
This Part lays out the ways in which “bail nullification” in its ideal
form—a public, bottom-up, popular intervention into multiple criminal
cases with a mission of disrupting the money bail system—has the power to
disrupt reigning conceptions of the function of bail. In particular, much of
the expressive power of community bail funds lies in their ability to
destabilize the rhetoric of “community” in the setting of bail. The modern
conception of the bail-setting decision is that a judge or a magistrate must
weigh the interests of an individual defendant against those of a larger com-
munity; they must set an amount of money bail that reflects “[a] proper
balance between the rights and interests of the individual and those of soci-
ety.”141 Although judges and magistrates set bail according to a host of fac-
tors and recommendations from legislators, the concept of “community”
consistently pervades and justifies the bail-setting process. When a judge sets
bail, she does so on behalf of the community and for the protection of the
community. Community bail funds disrupt this reigning definition of com-
munity, undermining the defendant-community dichotomy in the setting of
bail. By nullifying bail determinations, community bail funds tell judges: do
not set bail in our name.
This Part begins by laying out the two main ways in which the rhetoric
of community infuses the discretionary bail-setting process—through the
protection of “community” safety to justify detention and the search for
“community ties” to justify release. Overall, what emerges is a conception of
community that pits the interests of local residents against those of a lone
defendant and her family. The assumption is that the larger community in-
terest is never on the side of a defendant’s release, that local residents will
always prefer the setting of money bail to the risk of flight or crime posed by
releasing a defendant without surety. But this limited vision of community is
not set in stone. This Part concludes by setting forth the alternative vision of
community presented by bail nullification: one in which the community ex-
ists on both sides of the scale, and has interests in both safety and freedom.
A. Community Safety
The starkest form of the defendant-community dichotomy, one that
truly pits the defendant against the community, comes in the idea of pro-
tecting community safety through the setting of bail. Historically, the sole
ostensible purpose of money bail was to ensure that defendants returned to
141. Thomas, supra note 124, at 229 (quoting Rep. of the Judicial Council Comm. to
Study the Operation of the Bail Reform Act in the Dist. of Columbia: Hearings on Preventive
Det. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong. 736 (1969)); see also Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: II, 113 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1125, 1151 (1965) (“[F]or the hypothetical defendant we would be required to weigh
the risk of prejudice to him as a result of detention against the risk to the community that if
released he might abscond, commit further crimes, or injure the Government’s informer.”).
March 2017] Bail Nullification 613
court.142 For much of American history, however, judges have maintained
widespread practices of setting bail for the purposes of securing guilty pleas
or preventing crimes while cases were pending. A series of studies by Profes-
sor Caleb Foote in the 1950s, for instance, documented that judges set bail to
“break” crime waves, give defendants a “taste of jail,” or otherwise “protect
the community.”143 By the 1970s, it was fairly common knowledge—tacitly
understood—that judges set bail out of fear that someone they release will
commit a crime while their case was pending.144
The bail reform wave of the 1970s and 1980s formalized these practices
and gave them a name: community safety.145 Beginning with the passage of
the D.C. Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970,146 the following
two decades saw a rush of state statutes and constitutional amendments that
expanded the use of bail and pretrial detention by giving judges the ability to
detain to prevent future crime.147 The vast majority of these new bail statutes
used the word “community” when defining dangerousness.148 A judge may
142. See Schnacke, supra note 32, at 27; Thomas, supra note 124, at 3–8; Gouldin, supra
note 35 (manuscript at 7–10).
143. See, e.g., Foote, supra note 124, at 1038 (finding that bail in Philadelphia was rarely
set with individual characteristics in mind and judges often set bail to “break” crime waves);
John W. Roberts & James S. Palermo, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City,
106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 693, 705 (1958) (finding that magistrates in New York City often set bail to
protect society or to give defendants a “taste” of jail).
144. See Thomas, supra note 124, at 245–46 (describing widespread knowledge of this
practice); Walker, supra note 125, at 55–56 (describing a long tradition of “covert” practice of
“judge setting a bail amount that is clearly beyond the means of the defendant”).
145. Walker, supra note 125, at 74–79 (describing this second wave of reform adding the
criterion of dangerousness to bail statutes and arguing that “[f]or all practical purposes . . .
preventive detention laws simply provided legal justification for traditional practices”);
Baradaran, supra note 29, at 750–51 (describing wave of reform expanding reasons why bail
can be set, including preventing dangerousness); see also Thomas, supra note 124, at 227–49.
146. D.C. Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, sec.
101(A), § 11-923, 84 Stat. 473, 486.
147. See Walker, supra note 125 at 74–79 (documenting this transformation); Matthew J.
Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 Ariz. L. Rev. 909, 956–66
(2013) (same). Most counts of the second wave of bail reform put the number at 34 states by
the mid-1980s. E.g., Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75
Minn. L. Rev. 335, 344 (1990).
148. These statutes either authorize a judge to set bail to “protect” the community, pro-
mote the “safety” of the community, or to respond to a “danger” to the community. See
Alaska Stat. § 12.30.011 (2014) (“danger to . . . the community”) amended by Alaska Act of
July 11, 2016, ch. 36, sec. 59, § 12.30.011; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3961(B) (2015) (“pro-
tecting the safety of . . . the community”); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-103 (2016) (“to protect the
safety of any person or the community”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 2104 (2015) (“the safety
of the victim and the community”); D.C. Code § 23-1321(c)(1)(B) (2016) (“assure . . . the
safety of any other person and the community”); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 903.046(1) (West 2016)
(“to protect the community against unreasonable danger from the criminal defendant”); Ga.
Code Ann. § 17-6-1(e)(2) (West 2016) (“threat or danger to . . . the community, or to any
property in the community”); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 804-3(b)(3) (2015) (“danger to . . . the
community”); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/110-2 (West 2016) (“danger to . . . the commu-
nity”); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-33-8-1 (West 2016) (“the safety of the community”); La. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 330.1(B) (2016) (“imminent danger to . . . the community”); Me. Rev.
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set bail, for instance, to “protect the community against unreasonable dan-
ger from the criminal defendant,”149 to “protect members of the community
from serious bodily harm,”150 or to “protect the health, safety and welfare of
the community”.151 Preventing future crime, or  protecting the community,
has taken hold as the primary reason that judges set bail.152
The trend of amending statutes and constitutions to account for pro-
tecting the “community” has continued into the present day. In 2014, for
example, New Jersey amended its constitution to allow judges to detain or
set bail to “protect the safety of any other person or the community.”153 And
in recent years judicial and political leaders in New York State—the only
state that does not currently authorize bail or pretrial detention to prevent
future crime—have called for the reform of the state’s bail statute to include
preventive detention to protect the community.154
The concept of community as an opposing force to the defendant is not
confined to statutes or state constitutions. To the contrary, because most
statutes require that judges set their reasons for a bail determination on the
Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1002 (2016) (“the safety of others in the community”); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 544.457 (West 2016) (“danger to . . . the community”); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-9-106
(2015) (“protect the safety of the community”); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29-901 (LexisNexis
2015) (“safety of . . . persons in the community”); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 178.484 (LexisNexis
2011) (“to protect the health, safety and welfare of the community”); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 597:2 (2001) (“the safety of . . . the community”); N.M. R. Ann. Rule 5-401 (2016) (“the
safety of . . . the community”); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2937.222 (LexisNexis Supp. 2016) (“a
substantial risk of serious physical harm to . . . the community”); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22,
§ 1105.3 (West 2016) (“risk of danger to the community”); S.C Code Ann. § 17-15-10 (2015)
(“unreasonable danger to the community”); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-43-2 (2015) (“danger
to . . . the community”); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 969.01 (West 2015) (“protect members of the
community from serious bodily harm”). Needless to say, in none of these statutes does the
legislature define the word “community.”
149. Fla. Stat. § 903.046 (2015).
150. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 969.01 (West 2015).
151. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 178.484 (LexisNexis 2011).
152. Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 24, at 545–50 (finding that since statutes changed
in the 1970s and 1980s, judges tend to rely on predictions of dangerousness rather than flight
risk, even when statutes tell them to consider flight risk as a primary consideration). Statutes
vary, however, in the extent to which they instruct judges to take public safety into account
when either setting or forfeiting bail. See Gouldin, supra note 35 (manuscript at 15–26)
(describing the vast array of statutes and practices and arguing that public safety should in-
volve a separate assessment).
153. N.J. Const. art I, § 11 (amended 2014); see also Matt Arco, Election Day 2014: Voters
Approve Bail Reform Measure, NJ.com (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/
2014/11/election_day_2014_voters_approve_bail_reform_measure.html [https://perma.cc/
2HTH-M48T].
154. Jonathan Lippmann, The State of the Judiciary 2013, at 3 (2013), https://
www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/news/SOJ-2013.pdf [https:/perma.cc/YU2Y-TMM9] (“The time has
come to join 46 other states and the District of Columbia by changing New York’s bail laws to
require judges to take into account public safety considerations.”); Laura Nahmias, Shifting
Tone, De Blasio Proposes Tougher Bail Plan, Politico (Oct. 23, 2015, 3:46 PM), http://
www.capitalnewyork.com/article/city-hall/2015/10/8580623/shifting-tone-de-blasio-proposes-
tougher-bail-plan [https://perma.cc/ZUX2-PM9R].
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record,155 prosecutors often invoke “community safety” when requesting bail
and judges routinely name protecting the “community” as a reason for a bail
decision. It is in the name of the “community,” then, that on any given day
in America there are nearly half a million people being held in local jails
pretrial, nine out of ten of whom are there because they cannot afford to pay
the bail that a judge has set.156
The idea of community protection has played a prominent role in fed-
eral constitutional jurisprudence as well. For example, when the Supreme
Court examined the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 under
the Excessive Bail and Due Process Clauses in United States v. Salerno, the
Court sanctioned the use of pretrial detention to protect public safety by
explicitly describing a defendant’s interest in liberty and the community’s
interest in safety as two sides of a scale.157 The Court found that the Act was
constitutional because “the Government’s regulatory interest in community
safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty
interest.”158 The constitutionality of pretrial detention under both the Due
Process and Excessive Bail Clauses thus rests on the assumption, implied
throughout Salerno, that a community’s interest weighs in favor of pretrial
detention.
Again and again, the assumption is that communities always benefit
from pretrial detention, and that community safety cannot align with a de-
fendant’s liberty interests. Bail statutes and leading judicial decisions do not
acknowledge that a community might actually want a fellow community
member to be free pending trial—to earn money at their job, raise their
children, participate in their own defense, and otherwise contribute to the
community while waiting for a trial or resolution of their case. The reigning
conception of “community safety” allows prosecutors and judges to invoke
the term and feel secure that they are serving communal interests by impos-
ing bail and detaining a defendant pretrial.
155. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1077 (West 2016) (“[I]f bail is allowed, the trial
court shall state the reason therefor”); Mich. Ct. R. Prac. § 6.106 (West 2006) (“If the court
determines for reasons it states on the record that the defendant’s appearance or the protec-
tion of the public cannot otherwise be assured, money bail . . . may be required.”). In some
states, however, a judge must only state reasons for bail when the bail deviates from a set “bail
schedule.” See, e.g., Ex parte Brown, 792 So. 2d 441, 443 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (finding that
lower courts must state their reasons when setting bail “substantially higher than that recom-
mended by the bail schedule”).
156. See Todd D. Minton & Daniela Golinelli, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2013—Statistical Tables (2014), http://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim13st.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4LA-J39Q]; Subramanian et al.,
supra note 22, at 32.
157. 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (“On the other side of the scale, of course, is the individ-
ual’s strong interest in liberty.”).
158. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748.
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B. Community Ties
Although community safety is the most prominent way in which the
concept of community plays out in the bail decision, there is another con-
cept of “community” that carries a specific connotation in the context of
bail.  The “community” offers a means of securing someone’s return to
court when they fit into traditional ideas of “community ties”: employment,
stability, and respectable family connections.159 This idea of “community
ties” was a core part of the first wave of bail reform that spread across the
United States in the 1960s, a wave aimed at reducing the use of pretrial
detention.160 This wave of reform saw the widespread creation of new, local
agencies that interview defendants before a bail decision and provide recom-
mendations to judges as to whether to release a defendant pretrial.161 Meant
to facilitate the release of more people pretrial, these agencies usually look to
what they term “community ties”—stable homes, stable jobs, working tele-
phone lines, or reachable family members—as indicators that someone
should be released without bail.162
This idea of “community ties” came to the foreground of bail reform
with the success of the Vera Institute of Justice’s Manhattan Bail Project,
which began operations in 1961. The purpose of the Manhattan Bail Project
was to use interviews with pretrial service agencies to facilitate release and
reduce inequities in pretrial detention—by focusing on a defendant’s rela-
tionship to the community rather than assumptions alone, judges could bet-
ter individualize bail decisionmaking.163 Bail Project interviewers filled out a
score sheet that rated a defendant’s likelihood to return based on these
“community ties,” as well as prior criminal record and time of return date.164
During the first years of the Bail Project, thousands of defendants were re-
leased pretrial as a result of these prearraignment interviews that concen-
trated on community ties; all but 1.6 percent of these released defendants
came back to court for their court dates, and the likelihood that their cases
159. Malcom M. Feeley, Court Reform on Trial 32 (1983).
160. Id. at 31–33 (describing the rise of the concept of community ties); John S.
Goldkamp, Two Classes of Accused: A Study of Bail and Detention in American Jus-
tice 224 (1979) (“[I]t is no understatement to conclude that the community-ties rationale has
been at the heart of bail reform activity for many years.”).
161. See John S. Goldkamp & Michael R. Gottfredson, Policy Guidelines for Bail:
An Experiment in Reform 21 (1985); Walker, supra note 125, at 66 (describing as a “major
institutional innovation” the creation of “pretrial services agencies with staff who would inter-
view arrestees, obtain the necessary information on their background, attempt to verify the
information, and make bail recommendations to the judge,” and noting that “many used a
formal point system”).
162. Walker, supra note 125, at 66.
163. See Marion C. Katsive, New Areas for Bail Reform: A Report on the Man-
hattan Bail Reevaluation Project 2–3 (1968), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/re
sources/downloads/1497.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NS8-4TWW].
164. See id. at app. III (reproduction of arraignment screening form).
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ended in an acquittal increased significantly.165 By 1973, the success of the
Manhattan Bail Project led to prearraignment interviews in over half the
states, with most programs explicitly modeled on the Manhattan Bail Pro-
ject’s score sheet of community ties.166
At first glance, the idea of community ties appears to place the “com-
munity” on the same side as the defendant, thus balancing out the commu-
nity-defendant dichotomy described earlier.167 But the rhetorical power of
the term “community ties” does something subtler than that. Because the
term relies on a limited definition of someone with community ties—some-
one with a stable residence, a stable job, a reachable and local family mem-
ber—many, if not most, defendants are written out of the “community.”
Indeed, for the most marginalized—the destitute, the homeless, and the un-
employed—the idea of “community ties” is not much help.168 The idea of
“community ties” thus potentially reinforces social divisions and inequali-
ties. Writing in 1965 at the peak of reform efforts aimed at identifying these
“community ties,” Professor Caleb Foote argued this directly, stating: “A[ ]
. . . problem with a standard such as the defendant’s reliability and roots in
his community is that in application it will inevitably result in discrimina-
tion against the poor and, indirectly, the Negro.”169
Some recent reform efforts have been aimed at reducing the use of
“community ties” in predictive instruments that judges and pretrial agencies
use to predict danger and flight risk.170 This is, in part, because traditional
165. Scott Kohler, Vera Institute of Justice: Manhattan Bail Project, in Joel L. Fleishman
et al., Casebook for the Foundation: A Great American Secret 81–83 (2007).
166. See Feeley, supra note 159 at 33 (noting that 112 pretrial release projects existed by
1973); Thomas, supra note 124, at 20–27; id. at 27 n.15 (“By 1971 at least thirty-six states had
enacted statutes authorizing the release of defendants on their own recognizance.”) The con-
cept of community ties has made its way into formal bail statues as well. See, e.g., N.Y. Crim.
Proc. Law § 510.30 (McKinney 2016) (stating list of factors to take into account when decid-
ing whether to set bail, including employment, family ties, and residence in the community)
167. See supra Section II.A.
168. See Thomas, supra note 124, at 158 (arguing that most bail projects instituted in the
1960s “were limiting their services to highly qualified defendants”); id. at 159 (“[For] the bulk
of inmates who cannot be helped by the Bail Project, . . . there is the unavoidable sense of
tragedy that many of these people have been refused for most of their lives.” (quoting Phila-
delphia Bar Foundation Project, Progress Report, Feb. 9, 1966–67, at 11 (1967))); see
also Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959, 962 (1965)
(“Even in a jurisdiction with an extensive project a substantial proportion of urban indigent
defendants would not meet the standards of reliability which have so far been applied and
would not obtain a recommendation of release.”).
169. Foote, supra note 141, at 1168; see also Walker, supra note 125, at 71–72 (arguing
that the focus on community ties “institutionalized discrimination against the poor in another
way”). More recently, Professor Bernard Harcourt has argued against such predictive instru-
ments that aim to predict what the best bail decision will be—prediction in this context serves
to reinforce “the derivative stigma that attaches to the drifter and the unattached adult.” Ber-
nard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction 221 (2007).
170. E.g., Laura & John Arnold Found., Developing a National Model for Pre-
trial Risk Assessment 3–5 (2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/02/LJAF-research-summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LEP-J33S] (describ-
ing empirical studies leading to development of a risk assessment instrument that does not
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markers of community ties turn out not to have a significant correlation
with rates of return and reoffending.171 But even these new predictive instru-
ments reflect judgments made by experts with the power to influence policy.
We are still left with insiders—judges and legislators—articulating their own
meanings of community, with help from prosecutors and bail bondsmen in
the rollout.172 And, when the experts create predictive algorithms, these pre-
dictions often reinforce and exacerbate existing racial disparities in bail out-
comes and attitudes toward marginalized populations.173 Moreover, these
new predictive instruments have yet to take hold in the vast majority of
jurisdictions, which continue to rely substantially—both in legislation174 and
in jurisprudence175—on the notion of community ties in the bail-setting
decision.
Together, the concepts of “community ties” and “community safety” en-
sure that the rhetoric of community underlies and justifies nearly every deci-
sion to set money bail. The setting of bail ensures the protection of a larger
“community,” and the existence of the defendant’s smaller “community”—
contain traditional markers of community ties, or any information from a pretrial interview,
but relies solely on the defendant’s criminal history and record of past failures to appear).
171. See Cynthia A. Mamalian, Pretrial Justice Inst., State of the Science of Pre-
trial Risk Assessment 7–11 (2011), http://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/PJI
%20State%20of%20the%20Science%20Pretrial%20Risk%20Assessment%20(2011).pdf [https:
//perma.cc/MN8R-87QA]; Laura & John Arnold Found., supra note 170, at 3–5.
172. These meanings are rarely explicitly articulated. Indeed, as Professor Lauryn Gouldin
has shown, pretrial predictive instruments often muddy and confuse distinct predictions be-
tween flight risk and recidivism. See Gouldin, supra note 35 (manuscript at 27–33).
173. There is a burgeoning literature that critiques evidence-based actuarial instruments
and practices in criminal justice along these lines. See, e.g., Harcourt, supra note 169; Jessica
M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. Rev. 189 (2013); Melissa Hamilton, Risk-
Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 231 (2015);
Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 537 (2015); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of
Discrimination, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 803 (2014).
174. See, e.g, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 903.046(1) (West 2016); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 510.30
(McKinney 2016); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 804-10.5 (2015).
175. E.g., Dunn v. Edwards, 569 S.E.2d 525, 526 (Ga. 2002) (stating that to meet his
burden at a bond hearing, “defendant must first present evidence showing his roots in the
community”); State v. Collazo, No. P1/02-2568, 2003 WL 21018296, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr.
22, 2003) (A judge must consider “[t]he defendant’s local attachments to the community, so as
to ensure his appearance in court regarding the charges”), aff’d, 967 A.2d 1106 (R.I. 2009); Ex
parte Nimnicht, 467 S.W.3d 64, 68 (Tex. App. 2015) (“[D]efendant’s ties to the community in
which he lives can be an assurance he will appear in court for trial.”); State v. Steele, 314
S.E.2d 412, 415–16 (W. Va. 1984) (“Also pertinent [to the bail decision] are the defendant’s
community ties . . . .” (quoting State ex rel Bennett v. Whyte, 258 S.E.2d 123, 127 (W. Va.
1979))); Peter J. Sampson, Judge Maintains $4M Bail for Man in Alleged Firebomb Plot,
NorthJersey.com (Oct. 31, 2015, 1:20 AM), http://www.northjersey.com/news/firebomb-
bail-request-denied-1.1445631 [https://perma.cc/K6GJ-GVLX] (describing New Jersey judge
using idea of “community ties” in denying a bail request). The concept of “community ties” is
pervasive in immigration court as well, where judges must determine whether bond is appro-
priate pending deportation or other immigration proceedings. See, e.g., Lora v. Shanahan, 804
F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2015) (describing “family and community ties” as a factor to consider
when deciding not to set bond in immigration cases), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 2494 (2016).
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family members with stable addresses and the ability to attend court pro-
ceedings—ensures the return of the defendant to court. This rhetoric of
community, however, does not envision members of neighborhoods, ethnic-
ities, or social movements who may not know a defendant personally, yet
possess interests that overlap with those of the defendant—for instance, re-
ducing jail populations, increasing community wealth through employment,
or building long-term community stability. Community bail funds demon-
strate through action that the community whose safety the court seeks to
ensure may actually benefit from a defendant’s release rather than from the
setting of bail.
C. When the “Community” Posts Bail
When the “community” posts bail through the use of a revolving bail
fund, it recasts the place of the community in setting bail. When a bail fund
pays a defendant’s bail or bond, the group is expressing its views that there
are some members of the community who, although they do not have close
ties to the defendant, value the liberty of their fellow community members
over the remote possibility of violence in their community. That fund may
not represent the local population, or any definable “community,” but the
fund’s members are at least a subset of the larger “community” around
which the traditional concept of bail revolves. A judge’s role in setting bail
can be reconceptualized as balancing a range of different community inter-
ests: on the one hand, protecting safety through the setting of bail, and, on
the other, respecting the interest of the community, broadly defined, in en-
suring that neighbors, colleagues, or allies in struggle are able to remain free
while awaiting trial. The “community” interest exists on both sides of the
scale.
Community bail funds demonstrate that a communal vision of “com-
munity safety” need not always weigh on the side of pretrial detention. In-
deed, releasing defendants while cases are pending can actually increase
community safety, even in its traditional measurement of incidents of vio-
lent crime. Studies have shown that pretrial detention is a criminogenic
force: because detention destabilizes lives, the setting of bail leads to more,
rather than less, crime in the long run.176 As one bail fund describes its
mission, it “pays . . . bail so that low-income people can stay free while they
176. For example, researchers recently calculated that every day of the first thirty days
spent in pretrial detention has a statistically significant correlation with increased future crimi-
nal activity. See Christopher Lowenkamp et al., Laura & John Arnold Found., The Hid-
den Costs of Pretrial Detention 19 (2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_hidden-costs_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FSV-84PB].
The study found that an individual is 1.16 times more likely to recidivate if detained 2 to 3
days, increasing to 1.43 times if detained 15 to 30 days. Id. For studies with similar results, see
Gupta et al., supra note 52; Heaton et al., supra note 24; see also Wiseman, supra note 23, at
1354–56 (describing how bail can be criminogenic). But see Dobbie et. al., supra note 52
(finding pretrial detention had no detectable effect on future crime, but led to decreases in
pretrial crime and failures to appear in court).
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work toward resolving their case, allowing individuals, families, and com-
munities to stay productive, together, and stable.”177 Bail funds publicize ex-
amples of clients who, but for the fund posting their bail, would have pled
guilty, lost jobs, homes, and custody of their children, and been much more
likely to be a burden to their communities in the future.178
Bail funds contest the traditional notion of “community ties” as well.
Bail funds express, instead, a more nuanced conception of a defendant’s re-
lationship to the community and to the court, one in which  even those
without stable jobs and family members can have community support.
Under that conception of community, more diffuse connections between
people who share neighborhoods, identities, and even visions of (in)justice
can solidify an individual’s connection to her local criminal justice system
and ensure that a defendant returns to court. Take, for example, the Lorena
Borjas Community Fund, a bail fund in New York City that posts bail on
behalf of women charged with prostitution who are Latina and trans-
gender—a population for which traditional markers of “community ties”
may be absent, but who nevertheless are connected to larger community
groups and networks.179 As one founder of the Fund writes: “[For] the
TransLatina community in Queens today, our community’s ties are woven
with history and resilience that is not measured by pretrial services assessing
flight risk.”180
The actions of community bail funds thus undermine entrenched no-
tions of community, leaving system actors unsure of what the term precisely
means. Although a stable family and residence can surely be helpful in sup-
porting a defendant, it may also be that the sense of responsibility to a larger
group or community can be part of what brings someone back to court.181
Or perhaps there is no community necessary to make someone come back
to court at all—perhaps the notion of money bail makes little sense in the
modern world, when a court can simply call a defendant and remind them
to come back to court.182 Although many bail funds take ownership of the
term “community” in the names of their funds, ultimately they resist the
177. About The Fund, Mass. Bail Fund, http://www.massbailfund.org/about.html [https:/
/perma.cc/3SBM-47M6].
178. See, e.g., New Media Advocacy Project, Brooklyn Community Bail Fund, Vimeo
(2014), https://vimeo.com/111652649 [https://perma.cc/QP8T-H5JV] (highlighting the story
of bail fund client Miguel); see also Newman, supra note 94 (“[H]igh-profile cases can be
useful for garnering support for the fund’s broader efforts.”).
179. See Corte´s, supra note 11.
180. Strangio, supra note 95.
181. Like community bail funds, microfinance depends on small donations to assist indi-
viduals in need. Some scholars of microfinance have argued that peer pressure is a key element
of the success of microcredit initiatives. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56
Stan. L. Rev. 345, 395–98 (2003) (summarizing the literature surrounding the group lending
form of microcredit).
182. Timothy R. Schnacke et al., Increasing Court-Appearance Rates and Other Benefits of
Live-Caller Telephone Court-Date Reminders: The Jefferson County, Colorado, FTA Pilot Project
and Resulting Court Date Notification Program, 48 Ct. Rev. 86, 89 (2012) (finding that phone
call reminders of court dates led to a 43 percent reduction in the failure to appear rate in one
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idea that there is one definition of community that should guide judicial
decisionmaking.183 Instead, they ask of us that we not invoke “community”
as a justification for the widespread use of money bail to detain, rather than
release, defendants pretrial. Recasting the role of community in this way is
not merely a feat of rhetorical change. As the next Part shows, destabilizing
the concept of community can play a part in changing both the constitu-
tional and political status quo in the world of money bail.
III. Bail Nullification and Legal Change
When community bail funds contest the meaning of community in the
setting of bail, this rhetorical challenge is in turn connected to the potential
for legal and constitutional change. I flesh out this potential below by identi-
fying points of engagement within the constitutional jurisprudence and po-
litical dialogue surrounding money bail. First, I demonstrate the connection
between community bail funds and broader political efforts at bail reform.
Second, I argue that community bail funds can engage in a form of constitu-
tional engagement, positing places in the constitutional jurisprudence—par-
ticularly under the Excessive Bail, Due Process, and Equal Protection
Clauses—where the ideas and actions behind community bail funds can
serve as a destabilizing force.
Community bail funds engage in what Professors Lani Guinier and Ger-
ald Torres call demosprudence, the mechanism through which outside
groups are able to disrupt, and ultimately change, legal and constitutional
meaning.184 Demosprudence occurs when “mobilized constituencies, often
at the local level, challenge basic constitutive understandings of justice in
our democracy.”185 This change in understanding, in turn, leads to changes
in laws and in constitutional jurisprudence.186
Community bail funds can exercise a form of demosprudence through
the recurring, performative act of setting bail. Through bail nullification,
organized groups do not just speak publicly about their understandings of
the law; they perform those understandings through the action of posting
bail. The everyday adjudication of a criminal case, from arrest to sentencing,
involves no public input at all—a defendant is arrested, a prosecutor decides
to charge a crime, and a series of short court appearances result in a guilty
county in Colorado); see also Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest? 115 Mich. L. Rev. 307, 338
(2016)
183. Cf. Laura I Appleman, Defending the Jury: Crime, Community, and the Con-
stitution 70–91 (2015) (discussing the difficulties with defining community in relation to
criminal justice); Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of “Community”, 2003
Utah L. Rev. 343 (critiquing the idea of community in the context of the restorative justice
and “community justice” movements).
184. See Guinier & Torres, supra note 140, at 2749–58 (“[D]emosprudence focuses on the
ways that ongoing collective action by ordinary people can permanently . . . chang[e] the
people who make the law and the landscape in which that law is made.”).
185. Id. at 2760.
186. See id. at 2753–57.
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plea or a dismissal.187  In prosecutions for misdemeanors—which constitute
at least eighty percent of state criminal cases188— court appearances are es-
pecially rushed and routinized, with little of substance on the record at all.189
So when a community bail fund enters the picture, the fund inserts a new
and decisive moment of community input into an individual criminal
adjudication.
Community bail funds, of course, exist alongside larger movements for
change. In particular, the last few years have seen a growing national push to
reduce America’s reliance on money bail and pretrial detention, a push that
large foundations, universities, nonprofits, and popular celebrities sup-
port.190 But community bail funds contribute something unique to the land-
scape of bail reform. They bring bottom-up action by marginalized
communities into the courthouse. The presence of a community group in
the courthouse, and the accompanying action of posting bail or bond, allows
community bail funds to contest the public meaning of not only money bail,
but also the criminal adjudication itself.191
A. Political Change
Community bail funds have the ability to play a unique role in pushing
forward real legal change in how money bail is administered in the United
States. Although there have been widespread attempts at bail reform in the
past, enduring change has remained elusive. We are now at the beginning of
what many have characterized as a third wave of bail reform,192 but we have
yet to see how far this new wave will push actual change in the administra-
tion of bail. The bottom-up, participatory nature of community bail funds
means that they have the potential to support legal and political reforms of
America’s money bail system that have a greater chance of succeeding than
some of the failed reforms of generations past.
187. See Simonson, supra note 5, at 2190–92
188. Natapoff, supra note 47, at 1320 (cataloguing evidence that misdemeanors account
for at least 80 percent of new state criminal cases each year).
189. Simonson, supra note 5, at 2191–92 (“[D]ecisions [during low-level criminal adjudi-
cations] are made behind the scenes by experienced players; adjournments are frequent; and
the proceedings are hurried, at times happening in a matter of seconds rather than minutes or
hours.” (footnotes omitted)).
190. See generally Laird, supra note 34 (describing this new wave of reform).
191. Cf. Judith Resnik & Dennis Curtis, Representing Justice 301–02 (2011) (argu-
ing that the presence of civilians in the courthouse can “deny[ ] the government and dispu-
tants unchecked authority to determine the social meanings of conflicts and their
resolutions”); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 8 (1983) (arguing that “the capacity of law to imbue action with
significance is not limited to resistance or disobedience”); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by
Deciding, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1745, 1766–69 (2005) (describing how, through actions such as
jury nullification, dissenting citizens can “remap the politics of the possible”).
192. Schnacke, supra note 32, at 1 (“In America, bail has been the focus of two signifi-
cant generations of reform in the 20th century, and appears now to be firmly in the middle of
a third.”).
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There were major efforts at bail reform in the twentieth century, most
centrally during the 1960s and 1970s, when new institutions and pretrial
agencies arose around the country in efforts to reduce the criminal justice
system’s use of bail and pretrial detention.193 The practice of pretrial deten-
tion, however, has only grown since that time—and especially for individu-
als who are incarcerated pretrial simply for their inability to pay their money
bail.194 Scholars who have studied the efforts at bail reform in the
mid–twentieth century have largely concluded that the failure of the reforms
to bring forth a true shift in the money bail system195 was based not on
unsound policies, but rather on a missing piece of political or social will to
incentivize institutional actors to act in the spirit of the reforms.196 Judges
and pretrial agencies, for example, may not have radically shifted their prac-
tices because they were afraid of bad publicity surrounding release deci-
sions.197 Professor Malcolm Feeley and other scholars studying those reforms
have concluded that what is needed for true reform is not an improvement
in the “science” of bail or the creation of new agencies, but rather the politi-
cal will to release more defendants pretrial.198
How, then, can we change not just the law of bail, but also the political
and social conversation around bail? Community bail funds, situated at the
intersection of formal procedure and local social movements, are in a
unique position to chip away at the political obstacles to real change. I do
not mean to suggest that they are the only method of political change, but
193. See generally Feeley, supra note 159, at 31–45 (describing innovative bail reforms in
the 1960s and 1970s).
194. See Justice Policy Inst., supra note 24, at 3–5.
195. To be clear, it is not that these reforms were a complete failure, but rather that the
anticipated sea change in pretrial detention did not occur; instead, pretrial detention has only
increased since that time. See Feeley, supra note 159, at 29–53.
196. See, e.g., id. at 29–53; Flemming, supra note 124 (arguing that politics, rather than
the letter of the law, guides bail-setting and led to the failure of bail reform); Walker, supra
note 125, at 79 (“The evidence of the two bail reform movements seems to lead to the same
conclusion: formal controls at best have only limited capacity to control bail-setting
discretion.”).
197. See Feeley, supra note 159, at 42–43 (describing how despite progressive reforms in
Oakland, judicial decisionmaking became more conservative); Goldkamp, supra note 160, at
224 (finding that judicial decisions in Philadelphia in the 1970s didn’t correlate with recom-
mendations based on community ties and concluding that “[a]pparently, judicial decision-
making practices are not readily reformed by the mere addition of alternative kinds of data to
the process” (emphasis omitted)); Wiseman, supra note 37, at 428–32 (describing institutional
incentives of judges). A recent empirical analysis by Shima Baradaran and Frank McIntyre, for
example, found that judges overpredict risks to public safety and could be releasing 25 percent
more defendants if they considered available factors appropriately. See Baradaran & McIntyre,
supra note 24, at 558.
198. Feeley, supra note 159, at 74 (“There are many indications that pretrial release can
be liberalized without specialized agencies and large staffs.”); Flemming, supra note 124, at
71–72 (arguing that the greatest predictors of a judge’s bail-setting decision are (1) political
demands and expectations and (2) local jail capacity).
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rather that they are in a singular position of bringing voices from communi-
ties most affected by mass incarceration into the conversation—and to do so
with actions, not merely statements.
Once again, the resilience of the Bronx Freedom Fund provides a potent
example of how this can work. As I discussed above, the initial iteration of
the Freedom Fund was met with strong resistance from local judges, one of
whom shut down the fund on the basis of a violation of insurance laws.199
But that was not the end of the story. The Freedom Fund publicized data
about the success of the defendants for whom they posted bail—it was clear
that not only did the defendants return to court (at a rate of 93 percent),200
they were far more likely to receive favorable plea bargains or outright dis-
missals.201 The Freedom Fund and its allies used these statistics to organize
around the issue of bail and lobby state legislators to change the local insur-
ance law. And they did. The state legislature amended its insurance law to
create a charitable bail fund exception in 2012,202 and politicians and judicial
leaders—including New York State’s Chief Judge—praised the work of the
Freedom Fund as exemplifying a just approach to bail.203 When, in 2015,
there was renewed attention to the issue of bail following the much-publi-
cized detention—and later, suicide—of Kalief Browder, officials from all
three branches of city government called for bail reform by invoking the
success of the Bronx Freedom Fund.204 The City Council has even set aside
$1.4 million dollars to form its own charitable bail fund.205
199. Supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text.
200. Clisura, supra note 128, at 327.
201. See Pinto, supra note 127 (“Without the bail fund, the sort of defendants it served
pleaded guilty 95 percent of the time. Of the nearly 200 people bailed out by the Freedom
Fund, not a single one went back to jail on the original charges.”).
202. N.Y. Ins. Law § 6805 (McKinney Supp. 2016); see also Daniel Beekman, New Version
of Charitable Bond Bill Headed to Cuomo’s Desk Could Free Thousands of Poor Bronx Defend-
ants, N.Y. Daily News (June 27, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/
bronx/new-version-charitable-bond-bill-headed-cuomo-desk-free-thousands-poor-bronx-de
fendants-article-1.1102795 (on file with the Michigan Law Review); Slattery, supra note 87.
203. E.g., Pete Barrett, Bronx Freedom Fund Seeks to Show Other Groups How to Post Bail
for Needy Defendants, N.Y. Daily News (July 14, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/bronx/helping-needy-defendants-helps-taxpayers-bronx-freedom-fund-article-1.1868270
(on file with the Michigan Law Review); Joel Stashenko, Lippman Lauds Bronx Group’s Non-
profit Approach to Bail Defenders, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 2013, at 1.
204. See Press Release, City of New York, Mayor De Blasio Launches Bail Lab to Safely
Reduce Overreliance on Money Bail (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-
mayor/news/711-15/mayor-de-blasio-launches-bail-lab-safely-reduce-overreliance-money-bail
[https://perma.cc/N4JY-32DJ] (describing success of the Bronx Freedom Fund); King, supra
note 30; Stashenko, supra note 203.
205. Michael M. Grynbaum, Council Speaker Seeks Criminal Justice Reforms in State of the
City Address, N.Y. Times (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/12/nyregion/coun
cil-speaker-seeks-criminal-justice-reforms-in-state-of-the-city-address.html (on file with the
Michigan Law Review) (describing New York City’s proposed bail fund); David Howard King,
Key to Vision of Closing Rikers, City Council Bail Fund Moves Through State Process, Gotham
Gazette (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/state/6206-key-to-vision-
of-closing-rikers-city-counsel-bail-fund-moves-through-state-process [https://perma.cc/
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To be sure, this is just one story, and a unique one at that. A host of
factors have led to the real possibility of bail reform in New York City, but
there is no denying that community bail funds have been a visible and im-
portant part of that story.206 The Bronx Freedom Fund is the oldest commu-
nity bail fund that fits the model of bail nullification I have been describing.
If I am right about the power of bail nullification, then in the coming years
we should expect to see the names of other bail funds, their clients, and their
success rates used in successful fights for bail reform. Community bail funds
bring names and stories to the abstract concept of bail. Because they are
connected to movements to build political power in conjunction with legal
change, they are able to mobilize larger constituencies to see bail in new
ways. And they do this all from the standpoint of real-life experience rather
than scientific expertise. Indeed, the “statistics” that bail funds use to
demonstrate their successes are far less rigorous than studies by social scien-
tists that tell us the same things—that money bail does not incentivize re-
turn to court any more than release;207 that pretrial detention leads to more
time in jail and more guilty pleas.208 And yet, local political leaders cite the
statistics of community bail funds more frequently than more rigorous so-
cial science.209 By changing the conversation around the relationship be-
tween the community and money bail, community bail funds can thus
provide living proof that the push toward bail reform need not be an elite-
driven enterprise, but instead can come from the populations most affected
by everyday local criminal justice.
B. Constitutional Change
Community bail funds also have the potential to shift our understand-
ings of the constitutional jurisprudence governing the setting of bail: the
Fifth Amendment right to due process in a criminal proceeding, the Eighth
Amendment right against excessive bail, and the Equal Protection Clause of
MS5A-HSLH] (describing how the New York City’s City Council is working with the Doe
Fund to set up its own bail fund).
206. Indeed, we are already seeing a host of politicians and journalists refer to the Brook-
lyn Community Bail Fund, which only began posting bail in 2015. See, e.g., Pinto, supra note
104 (profiling the Brooklyn Community Bail Fund in a New York Times Magazine cover
story); John Surico, ‘The DMV on Steroids’: Paying Bail in New York is Next to Impossible, VICE
(Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.vice.com/read/the-dmv-on-steroids-paying-bail-in-new-york-is-
next-to-impossible-817 [http://perma.cc/35EK-ENGJ] (describing the work of the Fund).
207. See, e.g., Brooker et al., supra note 117, at 8 (finding that for felony cases in Colo-
rado, court appearance rates and public safety risks were the same for defendants who were
released on unsecured bond versus those who paid money for a secured bond).
208. See studies cited supra note 52.
209. They are often cited by journalists, as well, in explaining the effects of pretrial deten-
tion. See, e.g., King, supra note 30 (highlighting Bronx Freedom Fund statistics); Pinto, supra
note 104 (describing studies by the Brooklyn and Bronx funds as proof that “[b]ail makes poor
people who would otherwise win their cases plead guilty.”).
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the Fourteenth Amendment.210 This process of constitutional engagement is
even less direct than that of political change. Social movement actors per-
form acts of resistance—namely, the posting of bail—that rub up against
established ideas of how to understand the institution of money bail. Those
shifts in the on-the-ground understanding of how criminal procedure oper-
ates then interact with constitutional questions regarding those procedures.
This shift in constitutional culture then makes its way into courtrooms and
judicial decisionmaking, so that bottom-up actions can actually shift the
constitutionality of money bail.211 This Section sketches out some points in
the constitutional jurisprudence surrounding money bail in which commu-
nity bail funds might play a part in shifting the constitutional meanings of
bail in America, especially when they function as a form of community
nullification.212
At first glance, the constitutionality of money bail in America is not in
doubt. In the 1960s Professor Caleb Foote prophesized a “coming constitu-
tional crisis in bail.”213 Foote believed that the Warren Court’s increasing
expansion of individual criminal rights could not help but collide with a
growing recognition that the institution of money bail functioned as a pen-
alty for the indigent.214 Foote envisioned this constitutional crisis in the form
210. I have chosen not to address in this Section the issue of whether pretrial detention
should be considered punishment, thus triggering more vigorous due process protections. Al-
though there are reasons to believe that the Supreme Court got it wrong when it determined
in Salerno that pretrial detention is not punishment, that precedent will be difficult to unsettle.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). For compelling arguments that pretrial deten-
tion is a form of punishment, see Appleman, supra note 29, at 1304–23; and Miller & Guggen-
heim, supra note 147, at 342, 351–57, 361–70.
211. A number of scholars have articulated similar processes in the context of other social
movements. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the
Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 27, 28 (2005) (discussing
how social movements can change constitutional law by moving the boundaries of what is
plausible); Guinier & Torres, supra note 140, at 2750–69 (describing how demosprudence can
shift constitutional meaning); Martha Minow, Law and Social Change, 62 UMKC L. Rev. 171,
176 (1993) (“Law is also the practices of governance and resistance people develop behind and
beyond the public institutions. Those practices may alter formal, public law; they also alter the
meaning and shape of law and provide a potentially rich context for social change.”); Reva B.
Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of
the De Facto ERA, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1323, 1323 (2006) (arguing that “constitutional culture
channels social movement conflict to produce enforceable constitutional understandings”).
212. This discussion is not meant to provide a comprehensive analysis of each doctrine,
but rather to identify moments in the muddy jurisprudence in which bail nullification can
play a role in clearing up the picture. My intention is to show how constitutional demos-
prudence can happen, even within individual procedural rights that seem outside the bounds
of groups and communities.
213. Foote, supra note 168, at 959. For a discussion of the strong influence of Caleb Foote
on the first wave of bail reform, see Walker, supra note 125, at 55 (“Caleb Foote almost
singlehandedly launched and defined the terms of the contemporary debate over bail . . . .”).
214. Foote, supra note 168, at 962 (“[T]he next major clash between our norms of actual
administration and the constitutional theories expounded in recent years by the Supreme
Court will revolve around the discrimination against the poor which is inherent in the bail
system.”).
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of a declaration by the Supreme Court that the Eighth Amendment guaran-
tees a “right to bail”—a right to bail conditions that actually lead to release
from custody in the vast majority of cases.215 Foote’s constitutional crisis
never came, however, and the “right to bail” was soundly rejected by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno.216 Instead, the Court held that the
constitutionality of a bail scheme under both the Eighth Amendment and
the Due Process Clauses depends on the relationship between the statutory
bail scheme and the government’s regulatory interest in setting bail—the
“perceived evil.”217
Bail has been stubbornly resistant to constitutional challenges, but Sa-
lerno need not be the end of the story. Although there is no “right to bail”
for all criminal defendants, there is room to challenge the institution of
money bail when it is set in an amount that a defendant cannot afford. In
recent years, a few scholars have begun to poke holes in the conventional
wisdom that the setting of money bail above what a defendant can pay does
not pose a constitutional problem.218 And a new wave of constitutional chal-
lenges is succeeding, led in substantial part by the nonprofit organizations
Equal Justice Under Law and Civil Rights Corps,219 and with recent support
from the Department of Justice.220 Community bail funds contribute to this
constitutional landscape by challenging the logic of the fit between the
state’s claims to want to protect the community and prevent flight and the
actual setting of bail in amounts that defendants cannot afford. Because the
215. See id. at 999.
216. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). The Salerno Court made clear that there is no “right to bail” in
the Due Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment, but rather a due process right to propor-
tionality between the government’s regulatory goal and its statutory bail scheme; and an
Eighth Amendment right that conditions of release “not be ‘excessive’ in light of the perceived
evil.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748–49, 753–54.
217. Id. at 752–754.
218. See, e.g., Appleman, supra note 29 (arguing that pretrial detention serves, in effect, as
punishment and that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right should attach); Baradaran, supra
note 29, at 738–50 (arguing that current bail practices violate the Due Process Clause’s pre-
sumption of innocence); Wiseman, supra note 23, at 1358–63, 1383–85 (arguing that pretrial
detention for inability to pay bail violates the Eighth Amendment’s excessive bail clause when
the defendant could instead be subject to electronic monitoring).
219. See, e.g., Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc)
(finding unconstitutional under substantive due process an Arizona bail law that automatically
detained undocumented immigrants charged with violent offenses), cert denied, 135 S. Ct.
2046 (2015); Pierce v. City of Velda City, No. 4:15-CV-570-HEA, 2015 WL 10013006, at *3
(E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015) (settlement agreement based on acknowledgement that city’s bail
scheme for low-level offenses violates the Equal Protection Clause); see also Pretrial Justice
Inst., Equal Justice Under Law is Advancing Pretrial Justice (2016), http://www.pre
trial.org/download/advocacy/Equal-Justice-Under-Law-is-Advancing-Pretrial-Justice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E2KP-6JJF] (describing string of successful lawsuits by the nonprofit organi-
zation Equal Justice Under Law).
220. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee,
Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 16-10521 (11th Cir. Aug. 18, 2016).
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validity of money bail under the Constitution’s Due Process221 and Excessive
Bail222 Clauses mandates a rational and compelling government interest to
counteract the presumption of release, to undermine the rationality of a
judge or a court’s bail reasoning over an extended period of time is to un-
dermine the constitutionality of that bail system writ large.
Recall that when community bail funds engage in bail nullification they
lay bare—publicly, from the bottom up—some essential ironies of money
bail. In particular, community bail funds call into question two key assump-
tions that underlie America’s scheme of money bail—first, that the threat of
losing personal money or the money of loved ones is a necessary incentive
for many defendants to come back to court;223 and second, that setting bail
promotes public safety by preventing violent acts pending trial.224 Commu-
nity bail funds reveal the direct link between economic status and case out-
come by demonstrating that individuals who are released pending trial not
only come back to court,225 but are also more likely to have dismissals or
favorable plea bargains.226
Now consider the interaction of these ideas with the jurisprudence sur-
rounding the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive bail. In Salerno,
the Supreme Court sanctioned the setting of bail to prevent violent crime by
holding that “[t]he only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is
that the Government’s proposed conditions of release or detention not be
‘excessive’ in light of the perceived evil.”227 A bail amount need not be per-
fect, but rather “reasonably calculated” to a compelling government inter-
est.228 This substantive limitation is elusive—how, after all, can one prove
that a certain amount of money is not a rational way to protect the compel-
ling government interest of public safety? What community bail funds help
to demonstrate through their actions, though, is that judges’ professed cal-
culations of how to prevent dangerousness and flight may not actually serve
221. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746–51 (laying out test for substantive due process in the
context of a bail statute and finding the Bail Reform Act constitutional because “[t]he govern-
ment’s interest in preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling”).
222. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (“Bail set at a figure higher than an amount
reasonably calculated to fulfill [the government’s] purpose is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth
Amendment.”).
223. See supra notes 115–117 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 176–178 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 181–182 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
227. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987); see also Galen v. County of Los
Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 660 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Salerno confirms that the Excessive Bail Clause
prevents the imposition of bail conditions that are excessive in light of the valid interests the
state seeks to protect by offering bail.”).
228. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (“Bail set at a figure higher than an amount
reasonably calculated to fulfill [the government’s] purpose is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth
Amendment.”).
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those stated government purposes, no matter the specific bail amount. In-
stead of asking “does $1000 in money bail make much sense for this particu-
lar indigent defendant,” the funds prompt judges to ask, “is it ever
reasonable to set $1000 in money bail for an indigent defendant?”229 The
actions and results of community bail funds make it more difficult for a
judge to answer this last question in the affirmative.230
Similarly, community bail funds may have an effect on an inquiry into
the constitutionality of money bail under the Due Process Clause.231 The
Due Process Clause forbids punishment without due process of law—with-
out a trial or a lawful plea bargain.232 Although the Salerno court made clear
that it does not consider pretrial detention to constitute impermissible pun-
ishment on its own, nevertheless, under a substantive due process analysis
the “incidents of pretrial detention” cannot be “excessive in relation to the
regulatory goal [the legislature] sought to achieve.”233 The Court’s case law
makes clear that both preventing flight and preventing crime are legitimate
and compelling regulatory goals.234 But a scheme of pretrial detention can
nevertheless be unconstitutional if it overdetains—if it does not cut finely
enough in determining which defendants must be incarcerated to meet the
state’s goals.235 Community bail funds intervene on both sides of this
229. The vast majority of criminal defendants are indigent. See Caroline Wolf Harlow,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases
(2000), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4QF-VY7W] (find-
ing that in the 75 largest counties, 82 percent of state felony defendants were represented by
either a public defender or assigned counsel).
230. Cf. Wiseman, supra note 23, at 1386 (“[A]ssuming that the . . . [Eight Amendment’s]
prohibition on excessive means of achieving desired bail purposes[ ]does in fact exist, the
continued detention of impecunious defendants despite the existence of cost-effective alterna-
tives to ensuring their presence at trial conflicts with even this rather stunted conception of
pretrial liberty.”).
231. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746–52 (outlining a substantive due process inquiry in the
context of the Bail Reform Act).
232. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
233. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747. Applying heightened scrutiny, laws authorizing pretrial de-
tention will “satisfy substantive due process only if they are ‘narrowly tailored to serve a com-
pelling state interest.’ ” Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 780–81 (9th Cir. 2014) (en
banc) (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 2046 (2015).
234. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (“There is no doubt that preventing danger to the com-
munity is a legitimate regulatory goal.”); Bell, 441 U.S. at 531 (“[T]he Government may per-
missibly incarcerate a person charged with a crime but not yet convicted to ensure his presence
at trial.”).
235. For example, in invalidating as a violation of due process an Arizona law mandating
pretrial detention without bail for all undocumented defendants charged with a serious felony,
the Ninth Circuit recently relied, in part, on a lack of evidence that the particular population
at issue presented an “acute problem” of flight risk for which detention was a carefully tailored
solution. See Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 783 (relying on the fact that there are “no findings,
studies, statistics or other evidence . . . showing that undocumented immigrants as a group
pose either an unmanageable flight risk or a significantly greater flight risk than lawful
residents”).
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scale.236 On the one hand, they undermine the weight of a state’s contention
that “community safety” is increased by the precautionary measure of set-
ting bail in a majority of cases.237 And, on the other hand, they demonstrate
that the use of money as a proxy for the amount of risk the defendant poses
to the community does not fine-tune the regulation of flight and dangerous-
ness, but rather distorts it.238 Because Salerno places so much emphasis on
the importance of the state goal of protecting the “community,”—the ma-
jority opinion uses the word community seventeen times239—to bring this
particular critique from the point of view of members of the “community”
is especially damning to the constitutional status quo of money bail.
Moreover, by paying money bail for defendants who cannot afford it,
community bail funds highlight the extent to which the system of money
bail ties a defendant’s economic status to the outcome of her case—an in-
sight that implicates the Equal Protection Clause. In the last two years, a
series of federal judges have held money bail schemes violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause when a judge or magistrate uses bail “schedules” to set bail
for defendants without an individualized determination of whether indigent
defendants can pay the amount of bail in the schedule.240 Community bail
funds come at the Equal Protection question from a slightly different angle.
Because community bail funds tend to post bail after there has been (at least
in theory) an individualized determination of what appropriate bail should
be, bail funds demonstrate that even these “individualized” determinations
can offend the ideal that “[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”241 Bail funds may
thus open up room for large-scale challenges to money bail schemes that do
technically require an individualized determination of the appropriate
amount of bail, but nevertheless in practice hold large numbers of defend-
ants in jail pretrial simply because of their inability to pay.
Admittedly, these are mere sketches of how the constitutional engage-
ment of community bail funds might play out. Community bail funds con-
test the legal meanings of money bail, demonstrating that “the people” have
236. Cf. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749–51 (describing community safety and the defendant’s
liberty interest as two sides of a scale).
237. See supra notes 142–158 and accompanying text.
238. Cf. Jones, supra note 35, at 938–44 (documenting studies over time showing that
racial and economic disparities are exacerbated by the bail-setting decision).
239. See Salerno, 481 U.S at 741–55.
240. E.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612, at *11
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016); Pierce v. City of Velda City, No. 4:15-CV-570-HEA, 2015 WL
10013006, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015) (“No person may, consistent with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, be held in cus-
tody after an arrest because the person is too poor to post a monetary bond.”); see also
Statement of Interest of the United States at 1–3, 8–10, Varden v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15-
CV-34-MHT-WC (M.D. Ala. Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/
press-releases/attachments/2015/02/13/varden_statement_of_interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W7R2-Z5G8].
241. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
March 2017] Bail Nullification 631
an interest not just in the safety of the community, but also in their neigh-
bors and community members’ freedom pending trial. When, over time,
bail nullification shifts the cultural understandings of the community’s rela-
tion to pretrial detention, that in turn can change judicial decisionmaking.
So that when a judge must look for the least restrictive means of bail under
the Eighth Amendment, or think through the effects of pretrial detention
under the Due Process Clause, she must think not only about the circum-
stances of the individual defendant, but also about the communal dimen-
sion of pretrial detention. For community bail funds to have an impact on
constitutional decisionmaking, the funds need not necessarily be parties to
proceedings, or even involved in the specific case at hand. Instead, the power
of demosprudence—when organized social movements change legal mean-
ing through their extrajudicial actions—is that it begins outside formal lob-
bying or litigation, infusing its power into the law through a combination of
cultural, social, and legal means.242
IV. Subversion or Legitimation?
In the first three Parts of this Article I have tried to create a picture of a
powerful and growing practice—community bail funds—that can at times
function as a form of community nullification in the world of plea bargain-
ing. This Section returns to this Article’s central analogy between commu-
nity bail funds and nullifying juries as a way to highlight possible normative
objections to—and, eventually, a defense of—the growing phenomenon of
community bail funds. The question remains: Are community bail funds
normatively desirable? Below I address two possible objections to the prac-
tices of community bail funds. On the one hand, one might object to com-
munity bail funds—especially when they resemble bail nullification—as a
subversion of the rule of law; and on the other hand, one might worry that a
belief in the power of community bail funds risks legitimizing an unfair
procedural scheme. I contend that a normative defense of community bail
funds need not fall to either of these critiques. I argue, instead, that the
practice of some community bail funds can fall under a more positive con-
ception of nullificatory participation in the contours of criminal justice, one
in which citizens join with the formal branches of government to interpret
laws and procedures and ensure their fair implementation. At the same time,
in order to stem the risk of legitimation, bail nullification will work best if it
is accompanied by social movements to eliminate the use of money bail and
substantially reduce the use of pretrial detention overall.
242. See Guinier & Torres, supra note 140, at 2745 (“[F]or legal change to reflect real
social change it must take account of, and engage with, alternative or contending sources of
power. Such change must also, in some measure, transform the culture.”).
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A. Rule of Law Concerns
First, one might argue that community bail funds subvert the rule of
law, surrendering a rational legal process to the whimsy of unelected com-
munity groups. Legislators have crafted criteria for a judge to consider when
setting bail, local pretrial agencies have made recommendations, and judges
have used their discretion to either follow a bail schedule or set an individu-
alized amount of bail. Although the concept of the rule of law has many
meanings in American jurisprudence,243 here the idea of the rule of law can
serve as a stand-in for the idea that legal rules come from democratically
elected legislatures, and judges then enforce those rules in a neutral and
uniform way.244 When an outside community group enters a criminal adju-
dication and upends an important judicial decision, that group may in turn
be disrupting the uniform application of neutral, democratically determined
rules. This might be especially true in a situation where a judge has reasona-
bly decided, perhaps based on a reliable risk assessment instrument, that a
defendant should be required to put a certain amount of her family’s money
on the line in order to ensure that she returns to court and does not endan-
ger public safety. When an unelected, renegade group decides to undermine
this judicial decision and free someone without requiring the defendant or
her family to post money bail, the act of the community bail fund may raise
concerns about uneven justice or even anarchy.
The longstanding scholarly debate over jury nullification has centered
on a similar rule-of-law critique.245 Some scholars have argued that juries
subvert the rule of law when they acquit a defendant who is otherwise legally
guilty—even if that acquittal is sometimes just,246 it is nevertheless pushing
up against the orderly way in which jury fact-finding is meant to proceed.
On the other hand, some scholars have defended jury nullification as in sync
with the rule of law—as a part of the legitimate workings of a law that is
responsive to community input. Professor Darryl Brown, for example, has
argued that when juries nullify to remedy an existing injustice, their actions
are in sync with a Dworkian conception of the rule of law that accepts multi-
ple sources of legal authority, including larger normative principles implicit
243. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,
97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 10–24 (1997) (describing four differing conceptions of the rule of law).
244. See id. at 18–19, 31–33 (describing the Legal Process conception of the rule of law);
Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 781, 809 (1989) (“The
point of ‘the Rule of Law, not of individuals’ is that the rules are supposed to rule. . . . [J]udges
[are] . . . merely instrumental functionaries.”).
245. See generally Brown, supra note 2, at 1150–52 (describing and critiquing a range of
critiques of jury nullification as in violation of the rule of law); Carroll, supra note 3, at
609–21 (discussing different conceptions of jury nullification in relation to the rule of law).
246. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 2, at 706 (defending race-based jury nullification but
saying that “[t]here is no question that jury nullification is subversive of the rule of law”).
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in current laws and legal decisions.247 Similarly, Professor Jenny Carroll con-
tends that jury nullification “creates a mechanism to lend predictability and
knowability to the law when formal constructs have failed to align them-
selves with the citizen’s own expectations.”248 When a literal application of
the law contradicts larger governing norms, then jury nullification serves as
a corrective from ordinary citizens who recognize the error.
At first glance, community bail funds do indeed seem to undermine the
ideal of consistent adjudication across multiple cases using set rules and
standards. When community bail funds enter the mix, the result may be an
uneven or unpredictable distribution of liberty among defendants, or
among counties or courthouses. Bail funds may also usurp the traditional
democratic process of delineating the parameters of the bail-setting decision.
And indeed, some judges and officials have reacted to community bail funds
as if they undermine the efficiency and goals of the system.249 But I contend
here that community bail funds as bail nullification actually represent re-
sponsive, democratic law at work—communal law, moreover, that pushes
against larger injustices in our current system.250
When community bail funds are rooted in local social movements and
give decisionmaking power to traditionally disempowered populations, they
use community participation to lay bare the hypocrisies of an unfair system,
enhancing rather than undermining the neutrality of the system. In the con-
text of the economic and racial inequalities that result from the bail-setting
decision,251 to undermine that decision by posting bail for indigent defend-
ants is to enrich the fairness of the process.252 Surely, this does not occur in
every instance in which an unappointed group posts bail for a defendant.
247. Brown, supra note 2, at 1161–66 (citing Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 266–71
(1986)); see also id. at 1164 (“[T]he rule of law not only permits interpretation of rules
through such sources [outside of the written law] in a manner that may yield results very
different from literal rule application, but may require it.”).
248. Carroll, supra note 3, at 621.
249. See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text (describing judicial retaliation
against the Bronx Freedom Fund).
250. Cf. Carroll, supra note 3, at 582 n.9 (arguing that with jury nullification, citizens
“shift the process of creation and interpretation of law away from the formal branches toward
the citizens themselves”); Steiker, supra note 65, at 553–54 (arguing that jury nullification is
more normatively desirable in times of excessive punitiveness)
251. See generally Eaglin & Solomon, supra note 50, at 9–28 (describing racial and eth-
nic disparities in the populations in local jails); Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for
Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 987 (1994) (finding that judges in New
Haven, CT “overdeter” black and male Hispanic defendants from fleeing after release on bail
by setting bail at seemingly unjustified high levels for these groups); Jones, supra note 35, at
938–45 (describing disparities in bail-setting practices and results for African-American
defendants).
252. Cf. Brown, supra note 2, at 1167 (“[T]he jury’s nullification verdict—against, say . . .
biased criminal justice administration—may give (to borrow Dworkin’s terms) coherence or
integrity that would not [otherwise] result . . . .”); Paul Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal
World, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 1021, 1025 (2014) (“Our rule-of-law judgments depend not merely on
legal facts, like the language of legal rules or the actions of public officials, but also on the
nonlegal social facts that give meaning to those legal facts.”).
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But when a community group associated with a larger social movement
aimed at shifting criminal justice policies posts bail for multiple defendants
over an extended period of time, that group’s engagement with the criminal
justice process makes the process more fair.253 Moreover, unlike jury nullifi-
cation, which undermines a truth-seeking process in which the objective is
to deduce guilt or innocence, bail nullification intervenes at a procedural
moment in which the determination is—or is supposed to be—whether that
defendant will come back to court and refrain from violent conduct. If more
defendants can remain at liberty and make reasoned decisions about the
outcomes of their cases, while still coming back to court and remaining
crime free, then rule-of-law goals are satisfied rather than undermined.
The participatory nature of community bail funds also supports their
function within the rule of law. As I have argued above, community bail
funds unseat the traditional notion of a “community” in opposition to a
defendant’s release pending trial.254 They demonstrate, instead, that mem-
bers of a larger “community” can share a common interest with a defendant
in release. Perhaps, then, community members are in a better position than
neutral magistrates to assess whether a defendant is a danger to the commu-
nity or poses an intolerable risk of flight.255 Indeed, the inability to pay bail is
criminogenic: studies show that an individual who is incarcerated pretrial,
all things being equal, is more likely to be arrested for another crime in the
future.256 So by liberating a defendant by paying their bail, community bail
funds might actually be reducing crime. In other words, community bail
funds are in some ways engaging in the same cost-benefit analyses that
judges are instructed to engage in,257 but they are doing so with more knowl-
edge of the defendant’s circumstances and a greater understanding of what it
means to live under those circumstances.258 Participants in community bail
funds use deep, longstanding knowledge of legal and normative principles to
engage with the law on the ground.
All told, there are good rule of law reasons to support community bail
funds. But in the end I am not as interested in defending the practice of
community bail funds as within the rule of law as I am in defending it as a
253. See, e.g., Pinto, supra note 127 (“Without the bail fund, the sort of defendants it
served pleaded guilty 95% of the time. Of the nearly 200 people bailed out by the Freedom
Fund, not a single one went back to jail on the original charges.”).
254. See supra Part II.
255. Cf. Appleman, supra note 29, at 1355–60 (arguing that community members—spe-
cifically, jurors—might be better than judges at assessing whether bail is appropriate in a
particular case).
256. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
257. Cf. Carroll, supra note 3, at 582 n.9 (arguing that jury nullification occurs when
citizens “shift the process of creation and interpretation of law away from the formal branches
toward the citizens themselves”).
258. See Appleman, supra note 29, at 1356–57 (arguing that “the community often knows
the offender far better than either the prosecutor or the judge, especially in a state, municipal
or local forum”).
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normatively desirable method of popular input into an important procedu-
ral point of routine criminal justice that is currently administered in unfair
and troubling ways. Even if one subscribes to a formalist theory of the rule
of law in which only magistrates should determine who is released into the
community,259 one might still welcome this kind of subversion. Professor
Paul Butler has argued something similar with respect to jury nullification.
Although he sees jury nullification as conflicting with the rule of law, he
nevertheless welcomes it in some instances as a method of creating, rather
than undermining, true justice.260 Similarly, bail nullification might shift a
crucial procedural calculus away from the unfair calculations of institutional
players and toward a more equitable balancing informed by members of the
public with intimate knowledge of the criminal justice process. Whether in-
side or outside of one’s conception of the rule of law, the practices of many
community bail funds can survive the accusation that they undermine fair-
ness, neutrality, or equality in our contemporary money bail system.
B. The Risk of Legitimation
At the other end of the spectrum, though, one interested in a paradig-
matic shift in how America views pretrial detention might worry that com-
munity bail funds actually legitimate an unjust system. This is not a new
concern. In the 1960s, reformers at the Vera Institute of Justice—the same
reformers who initiated the Manhattan Bail Project and a new wave of bail
reform—initially considered creating a bail fund to help young defendants
between the ages of sixteen and twenty one.261 They later reported that they
instead decided that a bail fund would “promote the idea that an unfair
system could somehow be made to function equitably with the help of pri-
vate philanthropic support.”262 The contemporary iteration of community
bail funds may pose a similar risk of legitimation through charity. When the
act of bail nullification “works”—when a defendant returns to court with-
out having committed any new crimes—bail funds seem to act as something
of a private, pretrial-services agency, using charitable funds to help a proce-
dural process work smoothly. People are released, they often come back, and
the community renews its stake in local criminal justice. There is thus a clear
danger of bail funds legitimizing the system of money bail that we have now,
rather than transforming it.
Moreover, in states that take a substantial cut of bail money as a “fee”,
returning only a percentage of the original bail,263 paying bail can actually
259. Cf. Brown, supra note 2, at 1156–60 (describing the traditional formalist interpreta-
tion of the rule of law).
260. See Butler, supra note 2, at 705–12.
261. See Vera Inst. of Justice, Programs in Criminal Justice Reform Ten Year Re-
port 1961–1971, at 23 (1972).
262. Id. at 24.
263. See Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 1175, 1189 (2014) (describing this practice).
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end up funding the local criminal justice system. In Ferguson, Missouri, or-
ganizers of the bail fund set up in 2015 to bail out protesters associated with
the Movement for Black Lives soon began to fear this aspect of legitimation.
As they explain in an online statement, “as the money was spent, many
people brought up the problem of giving hundreds of thousands of dollars
to the very system we were fighting and began talking about . . . a ‘starve the
beast’ or ‘jail solidarity’ model (in which people would refuse to bond out of
jail and instead use collective pressure and organizing to secure their re-
lease).”264 Ultimately, the group rejected this proposal, choosing instead to
continue to bail out defendants arrested for protesting police violence—but
only if they were going to be held in jail for more than 24 hours, in an effort
to “move us away from financially supporting the system which we are try-
ing to fight against.”265 In jurisdictions in which a substantial portion of the
local criminal justice system is supported by fees and fines levied against
arrestees, defendants, and their families, this risk of legitimating the system
by paying money into it can be especially acute.266 Indeed, in Memphis, Ten-
nessee, the nonprofit organization Just City abandoned its plans to start a
bail fund there because the County Clerk’s office would not agree to refrain
from deducting each defendant’s fines and fees from the cost of bail before
returning the money.267
Community bail funds can indeed perform a legitimating function in
the world of pretrial detention, helping ensure that the money bail system
“works” as efficiently as possible and correcting errors when it does not. It is
here that the concept of bail nullification can help sort out when this risk
may be more or less likely. A community bail fund that resists nullification
might see itself as a kind of social services agency, ensuring that defendants
comply with court orders by providing support and pressure while a crimi-
nal case is pending. In the absence of a larger commitment to undermining
the current goals and trends of the local criminal justice system, such a com-
munity bail fund would indeed tend to legitimate rather than undermine the
institution of money bail by making larger efforts for change less politically
feasible.268
But when community bail funds engage in bail nullification they do
more than smooth the wheels of the existing system of criminal justice.
Community bail funds build power. Bail nullification is a form of dissent
264. Gott, supra note 14; cf. Christopher W. Schmidt, Divided by Law: The Sit-Ins and the
Role of the Courts in the Civil Rights Movement, 33 L. & Hist. Rev. 93, 99 (2015) (describing
how protesters in the civil rights movement chose to stay in jail rather than pay bail).
265. Gott, supra note 14.
266. Cf. Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the Ferguson
Police Department 42–62 (2015) (describing how through levying fees and fines, the “Fer-
guson municipal court . . . [handles cases] not with the primary goal of administering justice
or protecting the rights of the accused, but of maximizing revenue.”).
267. See Sells, supra note 10.
268. I explore the legitimating potential of bail funds and other innovations in bail reform
in more detail in a separate work. See Jocelyn Simonson, When the City Posts Bail (Sept. 30,
2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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through performance, a demonstration to institutional actors and the public
alike that the status quo of money bail is not “working” as it claims to be
doing. It is the action of posting bail that gives bail nullification its power—
community bail funds are “acting radically” rather than “speaking radi-
cally,”269 and they are doing so using the very processes whose meanings
they seek to shift. Just like the black box of a jury, there can be infinite
reasons why a bail fund sets bail for a stranger. But when a community bail
fund with a stated mission—to support a marginalized community,270 to
bolster a movement against police brutality271—is the entity to post bail, and
when the action is made by decisionmakers who are part of traditionally
marginalized communities,272 that action constitutes a larger social and po-
litical statement. This is not to say that the normative good of bail nullifica-
tion is participation for its own sake—it is not a theory of procedural justice
in which having a say in the matter is its own reward.273 Instead, the goal of
bail nullification is to shift legal conceptions of the institution of bail toward
a more honest, substantive understanding of how and why we incarcerate
defendants pending trial, and toward an understanding that is informed by
the experiences of marginalized populations who most frequently become
defendants themselves. The practice of bail nullification on its own in no
way guarantees large systemic change as a result, but the potential for true
transformative change is there.
Conclusion
Community bail funds demonstrate how bottom-up communal actions
outside of formal, state-driven processes can play an important part in un-
earthing everyday practices and shifting the legal status quo. Community
bail funds reveal the interplay between procedure and substance, disrupting
the normalcy of a procedure that impacts the majority of criminal cases. In
the world of plea bargaining, to locate moments of popular input into crimi-
nal procedure is actually to locate some of the only moments where popular
input—including nullification—can occur at all. The bail-posting decision is
not the only such moment. For example, in the past I have argued that
community groups who observe courtroom proceedings274 and organize
269. See Gerken, supra note 191, at 1766 (“Decisional dissent gives us a concrete practice
to examine, a real-world example to debate. We not only get to see whether the idea works, but
how the new policy fits or clashes with existing institutional practices. Speaking radically thus
looks different from acting radically.”).
270. See, e.g., supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text (describing the Lorena Borjas
Community Fund).
271. See, e.g., supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text (describing the Baltimore Protes-
ters Bail Bond Fund).
272. See, e.g., Corte´s, supra note 11 (discussing the founding of the Lorena Borjas Com-
munity Fund).
273. Cf. Guinier & Torres, supra note 140, at 2762–63 (explaining that the Mississippi
Freedom Democratic Party’s goal when it engaged in demosprudence was not political partici-
pation on its own, but rather the results that can flow from political power).
274. See Simonson, Criminal Court Audience, supra note 5, at 2183–84.
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copwatching groups275 are engaging in powerful forms of participation
through observation. Similarly, “participatory defense” has emerged as a
growing form of popular input into the everyday workings of public de-
fense.276 But community bail funds do something especially powerful be-
cause they facilitate actual intervention into one of the most crucial
moments of all: the moment when a judge decides the fate of a case by
determining whether or not money bail will be set so high that it will lead to
a defendant’s pretrial detention. When community bail funds intervene at
this moment, they shift the meaning of bail—and ultimately, justice—back
into the hands of the people most affected by the practice. Community bail
funds move us closer to a democratic ideal, helping us imagine a system of
criminal adjudication that is truly responsive to local, popular demands for
justice.
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